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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explain the US Government’s role in the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. It asks why Lehman did not find a solution in the market 
before it was too late, and why the Government did not bail Lehman out. The 
empirical account suggests that Lehman could have found a solution if this was its 
preference, and that the government did indeed, counter to the official explanation, 
have the power to rescue Lehman from bankruptcy. The thesis’ stylized game 
theoretical analysis shows that the Government’s choice of policy, displayed in how it 
dealt with events preceding Lehman’s failure, provided Lehman with incentives not to 
find a market solution, which eventually resulted in Lehman filing for bankruptcy – 
the biggest in history sending shockwaves around the entire world. The analysis 
further shows that the Government’s approach left it unable to credibly deter 
systemically important financial institutions from relying on a government sponsored 
safety net, which in the case of Lehman Brothers led to the sub-optimal outcome of 
bankruptcy.  
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1 Introduction 
Early in the morning Monday the 15th of September 2008 Lehman Brothers, 
America’s fourth largest investment bank employing just under 26,000 people, 
declared bankruptcy in what would become the biggest bankruptcy filing in history. 
At this time, the bank had more than $613 billion in debt (United States Bankruptcy 
Court 2008) and was borrowing over $20 per $1 it invested1 (Lehman Brothers 2008). 
The demise of Lehman Brothers sparked the biggest shake-up on Wall Street in 
decades and sent shockwaves around the entire world.  
 
There has been a big debate in the media and among economic and political 
commentators about how significant Lehman Brothers’ demise was in worsening the 
current financial crisis. As Professor of Economics at Stanford University John B. 
Taylor (2008: 15) put it, “Many commentators have argued that the reason for the 
worsening of the crisis was the decision by the U.S. government (more specifically 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve) not to intervene to prevent the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers over the weekend of September 13 and 14”. The debate over the 
significance of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy for the health of the overall economy 
and whether or not government intervention should have taken place continues with 
undiminished strength today, one year after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. The demise 
of Lehman Brothers and its consequences for the US and global economy is also 
central to the regulatory debate that has emerged in the midst of the financial crisis. 
 
My task in this thesis is not to add to the debate on whether or not Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse contributed to aggravating the financial crisis. The fact that there is so much 
dispute about the topic, and the mere chance that non-intervention did indeed lead to a 
prolonged disruption of the financial markets, worsening the prospects for the real 
economy, is sufficient to call for further research regarding the reasons why 
government intervention was not offered to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, and why Lehman Brothers did not manage to find a solution to its problems 
before it was too late.  
                                                 
1
 Lehman reported a gross leverage (total assets divided by total stockholders’ equity) of 21.1 in their 
3rd quarterly report of 2008, down from a high of 31.7 in February the same year (Lehman Brothers 
2008a). 
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The two interrelated puzzles that will be central to this thesis are that Lehman 
Brothers had ample time to find a solution in the form of either a merger with another 
company or a sale, yet the result was bankruptcy. The second puzzle is that the 
government did not step in to rescue Lehman from bankruptcy after having bailed out 
Bear Stearns, a smaller investment bank, six months earlier. I will in this thesis claim 
that after the bailout of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers had reason to expect the same 
treatment if they should encounter difficulties jeopardizing their continued existence.  
 
There is reason to believe that Lehman’s perception of what the government’s 
preferences were if Lehman should come to the verge of bankruptcy had a serious 
impact on its reluctance to find a solution before it was too late. The explanation most 
prominent among analysts and reporters as to why Richard Fuld, the chief executive 
officer of Lehman Brothers, was not able to find a solution for Lehman, is that he 
overvalued the company and failed to realize the severity of the situation facing 
Lehman; Fuld was overplaying his hand, and doing it too slowly (McDonald and 
Robinson 2009, Wessel 2009). As to why Fuld overvalued the company, the reason 
commonly given is that he had worked there for too long, was not up to date on the 
newest developments of modern finance, and that he kept himself isolated, receiving 
all his information through a small number of people. I will attempt to demonstrate in 
this thesis that counter to this explanation the government’s choice of policy provided 
Fuld with an incentive to drag his feet. 
 
In this thesis I argue that first, it is possible that Fuld was in fact able to sell Lehman 
Brothers; the absence of a deal was due to Fuld preferring otherwise. Second, Fuld’s 
reason for not wanting to seal a deal may have been that he anticipated a government 
bailout at the end of the road should Lehman default, and that this expectation was 
justified. Third, the incentive not to sell stemmed from the insecurity generated by the 
policy of constructive ambiguity chosen by the government.  
 
My main argument will be that the policy of constructive ambiguity, where the 
government abstains from providing a clear message as to what criteria guides its 
provision of bailouts and what will be the eventual terms, worked counter to its 
intentions and contributed to a bankruptcy that could have been avoided. In order to 
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demonstrate this, I will perform an empirical case study of the events that occurred 
around the demise of Lehman Brothers utilizing game theory.  
 
Analyzing the demise of Lehman Brothers sheds light on many of the central 
questions that remain unanswered after the bankruptcy of the investment bank: Why 
did the US Government rescue Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and American 
International Group (AIG), but not Lehman Brothers? How does government policy 
influence the incentives of financial institutions? Is there reason to update our beliefs 
regarding constructive ambiguity as a policy option for regulators facing financial 
institutions in distress?  
 
The following chapter gives an empirical account of the six months preceding 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Chapters 3 and 4 present the theoretical rationale for 
and against government intervention in order to rescue financial institutions from 
failure, and the options available for the government in intervening. Chapter 5 gives 
an account of the choice of method and discusses the methodological issues of 
relevance for this study. Chapter 6 analyzes the interaction between Lehman Brothers 
and the government by utilizing game theory, and chapter 7 provides a discussion of 
the results from the analysis before I round up with some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Six months leading up to a fateful weekend 
In this chapter I will give a brief introduction to the events on Wall Street during the 
months leading up to Lehman’s bankruptcy, and immediately after. Wall Street, as 
well as the financial markets around the world, was experiencing unprecedented 
turmoil during the period in question. This chapter will elaborate on the events 
unfolding from the shotgun marriage of Bear Stearns with JP Morgan Chase in March 
2008 through the demise of Lehman Brothers in September the same year. But first of 
all, what was Lehman Brothers? 
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2.1 Lehman Brothers 
Lehman Brothers was an investment bank originally established in 1850 which had its 
main office in New York. Being an investment bank, it operated somewhat differently 
from what we associate with traditional banking. Commercial banks are what we most 
often think about when we hear the word “bank” – these are the institutions that take 
deposits from customers and lend out money to a person wishing to buy a home or a 
car, or a company wanting to expand (Lott 2007). Commercial banks are heavily 
regulated, and are subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which 
guarantees all deposits up to a certain amount (temporarily increased from $100,000 
to $250,000 through 2009). Commercial banks typically give long term loans, the 
amount and interest rate of which is derived from an assessment of the client’s 
creditworthiness. 
 
Investment banks operate somewhat differently. An investment bank does not take 
deposits, and acts mainly as a broker for stocks, bonds and securities. However, a 
company can still go to an investment bank seeking debt capital. What happens then is 
that the investment bank assists the company in raising capital in the market by 
searching for an investor willing to put up capital for the client wishing to borrow 
(Lott 2007). In practice, the investment bank is in this case selling debt for its client. 
Thus it has no direct exposure to the client it is raising capital for; the investment bank 
deals mostly in papers. Investment banks are regulated by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
 
Having established what separates investment banking from commercial banking and 
what characterized Lehman’s business, we can explore the events that occurred during 
the months leading up to Lehman’s demise.  
 
Lehman Brothers narrowly survived a fallout in March 2008 (Brunnermeier 2009), 
whereas Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank had been acquired 
by its rival JP Morgan Chase. Lehman Brothers’ chief executive officer Richard S. 
Fuld Jr., who had worked at the investment bank for nearly 40 years after starting as a 
clerk straight after college, was receiving questions about the health of the bank ever 
since mid-July 2008. At the same time, the company’s shares were falling as seen in 
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Figure 1 below, its debt was downgraded, and investors seemed to be increasingly 
worried about Lehman defaulting (see developments in share price below). The 
situation bore striking similarity to the failure of Bear Stearns about four months 
earlier (Sorkin 2008a). Lehman’s CEO Mr. Fuld attempted to convert the investment 
bank into a commercial bank which would be regulated under the Federal Reserve. 
The attempt was unsuccessful, allegedly because president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, Timothy F. Geithner, did not believe such a move would solve 
Lehman’s problems (Sorkin 2008a, Onaran and Helyar 2008) and did not fancy the 
idea of an investment bank becoming a holding company (Nocera 2009). Throughout 
the following months leading up to Lehman’s bankruptcy, Mr. Fuld discussed mergers 
with competitors, sent emissaries to Asia and the Middle East looking for money, and 
tried to find a commercial bank that could buy the whole company (Wessel 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1: Developments in Lehman Brother’s share price from early 2007 to its 
failure. 
 
 
Source: http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/ (Accessed 7th of July 2009) 
 
Over a year previously, a round of talks to seek partners for Lehman had begun early 
in 2007, but the losses from subprime mortgages were already beginning to shake up 
the market, and discussions did not lead to results. With the fall of Bear Stearns in 
March 2008 things took an even worse turn for the financial market in general, and 
particularly investment banks. Lehman started discussing a merger with the British 
Barclays Capital in May (Brunnermeier 2009), and was also in contact with Korea 
Development Bank (South Korea) regarding a strategic investment. When the latter 
talks were leaked to the newspapers, the worry that Lehman lacked capital battered its 
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share price (Sorkin 2008a). JP Morgan Chase, the primary dealer of Lehman’s trades, 
had already in the course of the preceding month requested more cash from Lehman 
to serve as collateral under concern that the trades it was making on behalf of Lehman 
were too risky (Sorkin 2008a, McDonald and Robinson 2009).  
 
At the same time, Mr. Fuld was facing preliminary inquiries from federal prosecutors 
in New York who were investigating the company regarding its financial status, as 
well as investigations into whether Lehman had exaggerated the value of its 
commercial real estate holdings (Sorkin 2008a). Mr. Fuld said later in a testimony 
before the Congressional panel on the 6th of October (Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 2008) that he believed the bank to be in decent health until five 
days before its bankruptcy. 
 
According to Lehman officials, they believed in the week preceding Lehman’s 
bankruptcy that the firm had not one but two potential buyers ready to move if 
conditions were met; Bank of America and the British bank Barclays. Bank of 
America allegedly wanted the Fed to make a $65 billion loan to cover exposure to 
Lehman’s bad assets (Nocera and Andrews 2008a). Although the amount was double 
what the Federal Reserve (Fed) had made available in order to facilitate the takeover 
of Bear Stearns, Bank of America according to Nocera and Andrews (2008a) justified 
the request on the grounds that Lehman was larger. Barclays on its side allegedly 
wanted a guarantee from the Fed to protect against losses should Lehman’s business 
worsen before a takeover could be completed (Ryan 2009). 
 
Going into the weekend that would be the last for Lehman, on Friday the 12th of 
September 2008 at 06:00 the first of a series of emergency meetings at the Federal 
Reserve building in lower Manhattan began (Brunnermeier 2009). This meeting was 
called by Fed officials, and Treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. was also 
attending together with some of Wall Street’s top bankers. A proposal was arrived at: 
they would divide Lehman into two parts, one “good bank” and one “bad bank”. Bank 
of America or the British bank Barclays would buy the well performing part of the 
bank, while a group of 10 to 15 Wall Street companies would join together to fund the 
losses from Lehman’s troubled assets. This was a way for Wall Street to avoid the 
consequences of an uncontrolled Lehman bankruptcy without the necessity of 
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spending tax payer money. The proposal was, according to Wessel (2009), not well 
received by Wall Street bankers, since Barclays would be buying a potentially 
profitable part of the investment bank while the banks absorbing the losses would be 
stuck with the bill. At this time it had also been explicitly stated to the public for the 
first time that no tax payer money would come forward to facilitate a rescue of 
Lehman Brothers from bankruptcy. 
 
By Saturday the 13th of September, Bank of America instead turned its attention 
toward Merrill Lynch, believed to be next in line to steer toward bankruptcy if 
Lehman Brothers should fall. Paulson later allegedly claimed that Bank of America 
was never seriously interested in buying Lehman (Dodge and Mildenberg 2009, Ryan 
2009, McDonald and Robinson 2009). Barclays pulled out from talks on the morning 
of Sunday the 14th (Sorkin 2008b). According to Wessel (2009), the reason was that 
the British stock-exchange listing stated that in order for Barclays to guarantee 
Lehman’s liabilities so that it could open for business Monday morning, a shareholder 
vote was needed. Allegedly no shareholder vote could be arranged on such short 
notice, and the only way to bypass the rule was for the British Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) to waive it. The FSA refused to do so; hence a guarantee for 
Lehman’s liabilities had to come from the Fed. With the Fed unwilling to come up 
with these temporary guarantees, there were effectively no potential buyers left for 
Lehman Brothers. The only real alternative to bankruptcy was thus the government 
taking on all of Lehman’s liabilities without any prospects of a private sector solution 
in the near term. 
 
2.2 Setting the stage for Lehman 
The events during the months leading up to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy are of 
interest to us because it is reasonable to assume that the management of Lehman 
Brothers shaped their perception of what treatment they would receive from the 
government based on how they had observed the government treat similar institutions 
in distress before mid-September 2008.  
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Bear Stearns’ shotgun marriage 
In March 2007, Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank, had been 
valued at $18 billion. As mentioned, on the 17th of March 2008 Bear Stearns was 
acquired by its rival JP Morgan Chase for $240 million. The deal was backed by a 
loan from the Federal Reserve (Fed) to cover $29 billion in losses (New York Times 
2009a). The trouble for Bear Stearns, as one of the country’s largest underwriters of 
mortgage bonds, started when securities based on home loans started turning sour 
(New York Times 2009b), the technicalities of which will be thoroughly explored in 
the subsequent chapter.  Two of its hedge funds that were heavily exposed to 
subprime mortgages went belly-up in the late summer of 2007, incurring major losses 
on the company (Hajim and Lashinsky 2007), and in December the same year it 
reported its first quarterly loss in its eight decade history (New York Times 2009b).  
 
The market somewhat misinterpreted the establishment by the Fed of a special 
lending facility as having been put into place in order to help Bear Stearns specifically, 
and not the market in general, according to general counsel and executive vice 
president of the legal group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Thomas 
Baxter (2009). This contributed to a run on Bear.  In March 2009, after a weekend of 
intense negotiations, the Federal Reserve agreed to open a $29 billion credit line to 
facilitate a JP Morgan Chase takeover of Bear Stearns for a price of $2 per share, one 
tenth of the firm’s price two days before (New York Times 2009b). The price was, 
however ultimately increased to $10 per share (Brunnermeier 2009). In extending 
credit to an ailing investment bank, the Fed made an unprecedented and controversial 
move (Zarroli 2008). There was, however, ample uncertainty in the markets following 
the Bear Sterns intervention regarding the procedures and criteria for government 
intervention to prevent financial institutions from failing, as how that decision would 
guide future interventions was not made clear (Taylor 2008). 
 
Fannie and Freddie bailed out 
Just a week before Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, on the 7th of September 
2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two institutions which guaranteed or owned about 
half of the residential housing mortgages in the US (Brunnermeier 2009), were 
rescued by the government in one of the thus far largest bailouts in US history. 
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Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson justified the bailout by saying that the two firms’ 
debt levels posed a “systemic risk” to financial stability (BBC 2009).  
 
2.4 What was the source of Lehman Brothers’ difficulties? 
In order to answer this question we need to address the underlying causes for the sub-
prime crisis. This section will provide the fundamental reasons that explain how the 
sub-prime crisis could take place, and through which mechanisms the crisis unfolded. 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, my goal is not to add to the debate on what 
caused the crisis, yet it is necessary to understand the core concepts and trends that 
characterized and caused it. By examining the mechanisms that will be outlined here, 
we also gain a preliminary understanding of why governments even consider bailing 
out financial institutions that face bankruptcy.  
 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy was rooted in what originally came to be known as the 
“subprime crisis” (Krugman 2009). Three trends in the US banking industry 
contributed strongly to the lending boom and the significant increase in housing prices 
(Brunnermeier 2009) which eventually sparked the subprime crisis. All three trends 
were central to Lehman Brothers’ business model. 
 
2.4.1 Increased securitization 
The first trend contributing to the subprime crisis was increased application of the 
originate-and-distribute model, securitization which enables banks to move loans off 
their balance sheets. This practice enables banks to lend out more money – once a 
loan is moved off a bank’s books, the bank can lend out more money and still abide to 
regulations. In the originate-and-distribute model, banks repackage (securitize) loans 
and pass them along to financial investors, offloading risk from their balance sheet. 
The model manifests itself when banks create so-called “structured” products such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Once a bank has formed a diversified 
portfolio of mortgages, credit card- and other types of loans, it then slices the entire 
portfolio into different tranches and sells these to investors with different appetites for 
risk. The safest tranches, whose cut-off point is designed to achieve an AAA credit 
rating (the best), are paid out first from the cash flow in the portfolio, and 
 15 
correspondingly holds a relatively low interest rate. The riskiest tranche, often 
referred to as “toxic waste”, is paid out only after all other tranches have been paid out. 
This tranche is usually held by the issuing bank to ensure that the bank monitors the 
loans adequately (Brunnermeier 2009). 
 
The buyers of these tranches, as well as buyers of regular bonds, can protect 
themselves from defaulting loans by purchasing credit default swaps (CDSs). These 
are contracts insuring the holder of the tranche or obligation against default of the 
underlying asset. Estimates of the gross outstanding CDSs in 2007 range from $45 
trillion to $62 trillion (Brunnermeier 2009).  
 
Securitized and structured products are the backbone of financial operations. The 
securities that resulted from securitization became very popular for investors for 
several reasons. For instance, certain money markets and pension funds were only 
allowed to invest in the most secure, AAA-rated securities. Securitization allows for a 
tranche of AAA-rated securities to be extracted from a portfolio consisting of BBB-
rated (lower rating) securities, hence as a result institutions were enabled to purchase 
securities they were otherwise barred from obtaining through regulation. 
Securitization also became very popular with banks, since the backstops did not go on 
their balance sheets, enabling banks to de facto be exposed to the same risk whilst 
having less of it on their books, i.e. allowing them to take on more risk than intended 
by regulation since they were enabled to hold less capital. 
 
Structured products may have received disproportionally favourable credit ratings: 
Banks worked closely with the rating agencies in order to cut the senior tranches at 
exactly the “right” point in order to achieve the AAA-rating. Fund managers seeking 
the highest possible yield were attracted to buying structured products since they 
apparently offered high returns with only a small probability of any catastrophic loss 
(Brunnermeier 2009).  
 
At the same time, the banking sector relied upon risk calculation models when pricing 
these securities that were flawed, having been developed without taking data from 
sufficiently bad times into the data sample. For example, these risk calculation models 
did not factor in the possibility of a fall in real estate prices as substantial as the one 
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experienced during the crisis which started in 2007 (Eichengreen 2008), making the 
pricing of risk inaccurate. 
 
The popularity of securitized products ultimately led to a flood of cheap credit and 
deteriorated lending standards. On the premise that house prices could only rise, 
borrowers were given mortgages they would not be able to repay in the event that 
their economic situation deteriorated marginally, and monitoring was poor. The main 
reason for the latter is that the bank only intended to hold a newly granted loan on 
their books for a short while, after which the loan would form part of a structured 
product that would be moved off the bank’s balance sheet and sold to investors. The 
result was a housing bubble which laid the basis for the ensuing crisis. Although there 
was a widespread belief that the day of reckoning would eventually come, it seems to 
have been a common notion that it was more profitable to ride the wave than to lean 
against it. As Chuck Prince, the former CEO of Citibank (which the US Treasury now 
holds a 30 per cent stake in) put it in July 2007: “When the music stops, in terms of 
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got 
to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Buiter 2009). 
 
 
2.4.2 Maturity Mismatch 
The second trend leading up to the sup-prime crisis was banks increasingly financing 
their asset holdings with debt of shorter maturity, thus increasing their  exposure in 
the event of a freeze-up in the market for short term funding (Brunnermeier 2009, 
Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin 2008). Investors prefer assets with short 
maturities, since this enables them to withdraw funds at a short notice in order to 
accommodate their own funding needs (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). It also serves as 
a means of disciplining banks with the threat of possible withdrawals (Brunnermeier 
2009). Meanwhile, mortgages and investment projects have maturities of several 
years, even decades. This constitutes the maturity mismatch problem; financial 
institutions have long term obligations that they finance with short term debt. 
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In part, the maturity mismatch was transferred to what has become known as the 
“shadow banking system”, a system consisting of investment vehicles that were not 
included on the balance sheets of banks (Brunnermeier 2009). These off-balance-sheet 
investment vehicles, often referred to as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) (Swan 
2009), would raise funds by selling short and medium-term notes (maturity of 90 days 
to a year) primarily to money market funds. The short-term assets are called “asset 
backed” because they have a pool of mortgages or other loans as collateral, which the 
buyer has the power to seize should the asset backed commercial papers default. Since 
these off-balance-sheet investment vehicles invest in long term assets and borrow by 
selling short term papers, the SPVs are exposed to what is known as funding liquidity 
risk, in this case the risk that investors might suddenly stop buying asset backed 
commercial papers with the consequence that the vehicles find themselves unable to 
roll over (pay) their short term debt. In order to ameliorate such an eventuality, the 
sponsoring bank grants a credit line to the vehicle which is called a “liquidity 
backstop” (Brunnermeier 2009). In this way the banking system still in fact bears the 
liquidity risk from the maturity mismatch of holding long term assets while relying on 
short term loans. The risk just doesn’t appear on the banks’ balance sheets. 
 
The maturity mismatch in the case of investment banks’ balance sheets is mainly a 
consequence of balance sheet financing with short-term repurchase agreements, so-
called “repos”. A repo-contract means that a firm borrows funds by selling a collateral 
asset (like a commercial paper of some kind) today and promising to purchase it back 
at a later date. The growth in repo-financing largely consisted of overnight repo-
contracts – the magnitude of such financing almost doubled from 2000 to 2007 
(Brunnermeier 2009). The greater reliance on this extremely short maturity financing 
meant that banks had to roll over a significant part of their funding on a daily basis, 
thus leaving them very vulnerable to a reduction in funding liquidity. 
 
2.4.3 Leverage 
The third trend leading up to the subprime crisis was increased leverage. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total assets to book equity (Greenlaw et al. 2008) – that is how 
much the institution in question has borrowed in addition to its capital in order to 
magnify the potential outcome of an investment. For example, if an investment bank 
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operates with a leverage ratio of 20 [20-25 is a typical leverage for investment banks, 
10-12 in commercial banks (Greenlaw et al. 2008)]it means that it will hold assets 
worth of 200 which is funded with debt worth of 190 and equity worth of 10. This 
way all changes in the value of a leveraged investment, negative as well as positive, 
are magnified, i.e. multiplied by the leverage ratio.  
 
The leveraging (also called gearing) of investment banks in particular has implications 
for how they react when the value of their assets changes. Suppose that an investment 
bank seeks to hold a constant leverage level of 10; that is per $10 equity it can hold a 
$100 investment, financing $90 of the investment with debt. If the value of the asset, 
let’s say it is a security since investment banks typically trade with securities, 
increases by 1% to $101, the leverage has fallen to $101/11 = 9.18. Since the bank is 
targeting a constant leverage level of 10, it now has to increase its debt to match the 
increase in the asset value. In this case, debt financed securities worth of $9 must be 
purchased in order to rebalance the leverage level to 10: 
 
($101+$9)/11 = 10 
 
This mechanism also works in the opposite direction. Let’s say that the value of the 
securities holding now falls to $109. Leverage has now risen to $109/10 = 10.9, and 
the bank will sell securities worth of $9 in order to pay down $9 worth of debt, 
restoring the leverage level of 10. 
 
($109-$9)/10 = 10 
 
Hence when an investment bank is targeting a specific leverage ratio, a fall in the 
price of securities gives incentives to sell securities, while a rise in the price of 
securities gives incentives to buy. Investment banks in particular rarely target a 
specific leverage ratio over time – leverage tends to be higher during economic booms 
and lower relatively speaking during busts (Greenlaw et al. 2008). For instance, 
Lehman Brother’s leverage ratio increased from 23.7 in 2001 to 30.7 in 2007 and 34.9 
by the end of February 2008 (Lehman Brothers 2008). The balance sheet expanded 
correspondingly reaching its height in February 2008 with $761 billion worth of 
assets (Swan 2009, Lehman Brothers 2008). The implication here is that in a global 
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financial market consisting of leveraged institutions, price fluctuations are magnified. 
When prices develop negatively, the potential disturbances from a downward spiral 
increase with the amount of leverage in financial markets. While the potential gains 
and losses from an investment increase with gearing, so do the potential systemic 
effects, since the debt implied by high leverage has to come from somewhere.  
 
This chapter has provided insight into the main trends leading up to the crisis Lehman 
Brother’s bankruptcy took place in. As seen, investment banks are particularly prone 
to engaging in the activities constituting the main trends leading up the sub-prime 
crisis. This enables us to better grasp why Lehman Brothers was likely to encounter 
difficulties during the crisis, and gives preliminary insight into what one could expect 
to be the consequences of its bankruptcy. It also gives a hint as to why government 
assistance may in some cases be called for in order to ameliorate the situation in 
financial markets, which will be explored in the next chapter. 
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3 Government intervention 
While the above chapter outlined the concrete mechanisms through which the current 
crisis has unfolded, this chapter seeks to shed light on how financial crises appear 
from the governments’ standpoint, and what the literature recommends should guide 
their strategies for ameliorating the consequences of such crises. What considerations 
are likely to be taken by government officials when deciding on how to address a 
financial crisis and facing important financial institutions in distress? The idea in this 
chapter is to make explicit the lenses through which regulators can be assumed to look 
when diagnosing a financial system and financial institutions, the trade-offs they are 
facing, and what guides their decisions in determining how to address the problem. 
This will form the basis for the analysis in this thesis of how the US government’s 
preferences were shaped and what determined their strategy when deciding the fate of 
Lehman Brothers. 
 
3.1 In favour of government intervention 
Stern and Feldman argue in their book Too Big to Fail, the Hazards of Bank Bailouts 
(2004) that the main justification for governments intervening in financial system and 
providing help to financial institutions, is the belief that the cost of protecting 
institutions they deem systemically important from bankruptcy is smaller than the 
benefit they gain from avoiding the externalities of instability in the banking system 
and spill-over to the rest of the economy. In short, the rationale goes that protecting 
institutions that are systemically important helps preserve macroeconomic stability. 
Through the mechanisms that will be presented in the following, the rationale in 
favour of bailing out systemically important financial institutions states that the cost 
of the negative externalities that would follow is bigger than the economical and 
political costs that ensue from a bailout. 
 
It is argued that systemic risk, a concept which will be explained subsequently, is a 
particular feature of financial systems (De Bandt and Hartmann 2000). While 
contamination effects (spill-over effects) are not exclusive to the financial sector but 
also occur in other economic sectors, the likelihood and potential graveness of such 
effects in the financial sector are regarded as considerably higher. This is primarily 
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because of the qualitative difference in externalities following in the wake of a 
financial institution in distress versus for example a car producer in distress. Mainly, 
the reason for this is that banks and financial intermediaries trade much more among 
themselves than do other businesses (Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and 
Shin 2009). Before we can understand what constitutes systemic risk, we need to 
define what is a systemic event. 
 
A systemic event is one in which “the release of ‘bad news’ about a financial 
institution, or even its failure, or the crash of a financial market leads in a sequential 
fashion to considerable adverse effects on one or several other financial institutions or 
markets, e.g. their failure or crash” (De Bandt and Hartmann 2000). Central in this 
definition of a systemic event is the “domino effect” that is implicit in the phrasing 
“sequential fashion”, where a shock is “transferred” from one institution or from one 
market to another. When institutions that are affected in the second round (institutions 
suffering not from the initial shock but from the domino effect) fail as a consequence 
of the initial shock although they were fundamentally solvent ex ante, this is referred 
to as contagion (De Bandt and Hartmann 2000). 
 
Based on this terminology, a systemic crisis is defined as “a systemic event that 
affects a considerable number of financial institutions or markets (…), thereby 
severely impairing the general well-functioning (of an important part) of the financial 
system” (De Bandt and Hartmann 2000, parenthesis in original). According to this 
definition, the sub-prime crisis no doubt qualifies as a systemic crisis. 
 
There are different theories in the literature that define systemic risk in different ways. 
One of these is postulated by Kaufman and Scott (2003), who define systemic risk as 
the "probability that cumulative losses will accrue from an event that sets in motion a 
series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets comprising a 
system ... That is, systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction of falling interconnected 
dominos". The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) operates with a similar 
definition, namely "the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual 
obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction 
leading to broader financial difficulties" (BIS 1994).  
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Another definition of systemic risk focuses on spill-over from an exogenous shock, 
but does not postulate that there is a direct causation like a domino effect where one 
institution’s default inflicts default on the institutions exposed to it. According to this 
theory, third party observers perceive that an institution has experienced adverse 
effects from an exogenous shock. The third parties then assess the situation, and look 
at which other institutions bear similarities to the one that has failed, since they 
assume that high similarity signifies a high risk of the institution in question suffering 
a similar fate. The higher the third parties assess the similarity to be, the higher the 
perceived risk of failure, and thus the stronger the incentive to withdraw funds, 
suspend trade etc. to isolate oneself from the perceived risk (Chari and Jagannathan 
1988, cited in Freixas, Gianni, Hoggarth and Soussa 2002). 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue that contagion needs not necessarily be preceded by 
a default – a change in prices or in measured risks may in fact be enough: When 
financial institutions mark their balance sheets to market – that is they consider the 
market price of their assets and similar assets to be the balance sheet value of such 
assets (Kambhu, Weidman and Krishnan 2007, Brunnermeier et al. 2009) – a change 
in market prices has far-reaching consequences. The key to the rationale is feedback 
effects. If increased demand for an asset creates upward pressure on its price, then, if 
financial institutions target a specific leverage ratio, there is potential for a feedback 
effect in which stronger balance sheets create an increase in the demand for an asset, 
which in turn raises the price of the asset and leads to stronger balance sheets. Having 
come full circle, the feedback process can go through another round. This mechanism 
is illustrated in Figure 1:  
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Figure 2: Liquidity Spirals – the procyclality of asset price changes 
 
 
 
Source: Brunnermeier et al. 2009b: 15, Figure 4 
 
 
In downturns, as illustrated on the right in Figure 1 above, the mechanism works in 
reverse. Consider the case in which an asset that is widely held by hedge funds and 
banks experiences a drop in its price. Because of the magnifying properties of 
leverage, the net worth of institutions holding the asset can potentially fall faster than 
the rate at which the asset itself falls in value since all movements in the asset price 
are multiplied by the leverage ratio on the institution’s balance sheet, thus causing the 
equity cushion of the institution in question to diminish. One way for a financial 
institution to restore its equity in a situation like this is to sell off assets in order to pay 
down debt. As seen to the right in Figure 1, this adjustment of leverage reduces the 
institutions’ balance sheet and has the effect of fuelling further decline in the asset 
price, which in turn further weakens the balance sheet and encourages further 
deleveraging. This way, default is not a necessary condition for generating contagion 
– a mere price-change can prove sufficient since other institutions which are 
leveraged also have to adapt their balance sheets to the price changes. 
 
Furthermore, as asset prices drop, risk measures increase. Risk managers in banks put 
on the brakes and compel traders within a bank to deleverage their positions. This is 
exactly what Lehman Brothers did in order to adjust to the diminishing value of its 
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real estate holdings, as we shall see later. Like we have seen, deleveraging is pro-
cyclical, and when numerous market participants de-lever simultaneously in a stressed 
environment, liquidity simply evaporates from the market (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). 
The liquidity spirals that result from the self reinforcing effects that follow from price 
changes when financial institutions mark-to-market are the underlying cause of the 
procyclicality in the financial system. Hence central bank officials can find 
justification for government intervention in the financial markets even when there is 
no imminent danger of defaults 
 
The common denominator for all the theoretical approaches outlined above is that of 
externalities, and how a systemic event can spread through the financial system if it is 
not addressed. Systemic risk, as seen, means the same as the risk of contagion – the 
spread of negative externalities from one or more financial institutions to parts of or 
the entire financial system. The different theories present different rationales for 
which mechanisms transfer systemic risk from systemic events to the system. Without 
taking a stance as to which of the presented theories is most plausible in explaining 
the mechanism thorough which systemic events can impose contagion on financial 
system (the theories presented can be seen as complementary), we have seen that the 
literature provides a grim picture of how the financial system can be at risk when 
systemic events occur. This can be seen as justification for why governments should 
intervene when facing systemically important financial institutions on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The spread of negative externalities impact the economy as a whole, and 
this concern about spill-over is easily converted to protection of uninsured creditors 
for policymakers. How policymakers explain this fear of spill-overs needs be 
addressed to understand how the fear of systemic risk is converted to bailouts. 
 
According to Stern and Feldman (2004), the fear of disruption in the financial system 
stems from a perception that banks are the oil in the machinery that greases day-to-
day economic activity. Through the mechanisms that have been outlined above, 
systemic events can lead to payment systems freezing up and availability of credit 
going down with a negative effect for the real economy though increased 
unemployment and reduced production. Another reason given is that even the largest 
and most well-respected financial institutions can run into severe financial problems 
like runs that leave them with dark prospects of survival (Stern and Feldman 2004). 
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Diamond and Dybvig (1983) write that any external event that can make depositors 
believe that other depositors will withdraw their funds, can potentially cause a bank 
run. For investment banks, creditors not renewing their loans in effect has the same 
consequences as a bank run (Brunnermeier 2009). The proponents of government 
intervention claim that intervention is necessary and desirable to avoid these negative 
effects and market inefficiencies in order to maintain macroeconomic stability (Stern 
and Feldman 2004). 
 
Nevertheless there is also theoretical justification for not intervening in the economy 
in order to rescue significant financial institutions. Besides the ideological aversion by 
some scholarly traditions on this subject, the rationale presented mainly has to do with 
the cost of intervention, again with principal focus put on externalities. 
 
3.2 Against government intervention 
The main argument against government intervention is that it creates expectations of 
further intervention, which alter incentives for management of financial institutions: If 
the market observes that financial institutions in distress are bailed out, it fosters the 
expectation that once an institution is considered to be TBTF, the government will not 
let it fail. The expectation that the government will bail out systemically important 
financial institutions if they encounter difficulties that would jeopardize their further 
existence, is the perception of a subsidy to the financial institutions that are 
considered TBTF; an extra insurance that they do not pay for (Rochet and Tirole 
1996).  
 
This insurance, perceived or real, imposes moral hazard on the financial system. 
Freixas et al. (2002) define moral hazard as arising when “the provision of insurance, 
by modifying the incentives for the incurred party to take preventive actions, increases 
the probability of occurrence of the event being insured against.” Moral hazard is 
inherently forward-looking: an episode creates moral hazard in that it shapes 
expectations of how a similar episode will be handled in the future. In the financial 
institutions, intervention from the government may yield the expectation that the 
institution is virtually insured against all kinds of risk, including those that come 
naturally with the provision of credit and ordinary market operations (Freixas et al. 
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2002). This type of perceived (if not real) insurance provides the institution in 
question with certain benefits and advantages vis-à-vis institutions that are not 
perceived (perhaps equivocally) to be covered by such an insurance. 
 
Hence, there exists an incentive for banks to seek becoming TBTF in order to be able 
to enjoy the subsidy and insurance that comes with it. One may argue that financial 
institutions which are not eligible for government insurance like FDIC deposit 
insurance, i.e. largely unregulated enterprises like hedge funds and investment banks,  
have an even higher incentive to become regarded as TBTF by the government, since 
achievement of such status would reduce the risk of their operations significantly. 
Institutions that are considered TBTF are also likely to receive special treatment by 
the general market in terms of increased access to funding. With the cost of funding 
being lower than what the riskiness of the operations otherwise would imply, a bank 
has an incentive to increase the risk, which leads to a higher expected potential return 
(Rochet and Tirole 1996), but also a misallocation of resources for the economy as a 
whole (Stern and Feldman 2004). 
 
Furthermore, government assistance when given provides bank managers and 
shareholders with an incentive to engage in excessively risky projects in order to 
utilize the subsidy that is implicit in such a rescue to the fullest – the so-called gamble 
for resurrection. Another effect may be that if the market knows that the government 
will possibly intervene to rescue a failed financial institution from bankruptcy, this 
decreases the incentive for uninsured creditors to monitor as closely the behaviour and 
performance of the institutions they have lent to (Freixas et al. 2002).  
 
The intention of this chapter was not to conclude with regard to whether or not 
governments should provide assistance to financial institutions in distress. As we have 
seen, there are strong arguments both for and against government intervention. 
Nevertheless, in this chapter we have seen which factors are likely to be taken into 
consideration when government officials decide what strategy to choose when facing 
financial institutions in distress. In the following chapter we will explore what are 
their options. 
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4 The menu of options 
A government, meaning the central banks and the financial departments in general 
and the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the US, has several options on how to 
address a financial crisis and financial institutions experiencing difficulties. First of all, 
the literature describes three broad policy approaches a government can take: do 
nothing, rescue some, and rescue all. If a government chooses one of the two latter 
policies, a range of different means for intervening are available. The following will 
present the theoretical rationale for the different policy approaches, and elaborate on 
the technicalities and juridical prerequisites for the different means of intervention. 
 
4.1 Policy options – The broader approach 
Before exploring what concrete actions were available for the US government when it 
came to deciding the fate of Lehman Brothers, I will present the broader approaches 
governments can choose when facing financial institutions in distress. The first of 
these is to do nothing out of the ordinary, and let financial institutions in trouble fail if 
they are not able to find a solution in the markets. Such a solution may be raising 
additional capital, a sale, a merger, obtaining new loans or in any other way avoid 
bankruptcy without government intervention. 
 
4.1.1 Save all 
Governments can also do the exact opposite of the above, and assure financial 
institutions that measures will be taken to keep all significant financial institutions 
afloat – a way of dealing with the problem of systemic risk in a financial system 
(Dabós 2004). This policy is called the too big to fail (TBTF) doctrine, and states that 
government will intervene to prevent large institutions (most commonly banks) from 
failing. The institutions that fall under this category are the ones labelled as 
“individually systemic” in the terminology of Brunnermeier et al. (2009). What the 
policy implies is that once an institution is considered to be individually systemic, you 
cannot let it fail, as that would impose intolerable systemic risk on the system. 
 
 28 
The concept was born in September 1984, after the bailout of among others 
Continental Illinois in May that year, when the Comptroller of the Currency testified 
before the US Congress that some banks were in fact deemed too big to fail, and that 
these banks could enjoy complete deposit insurance (O'Hara and Shaw 1990), that is 
insurance that exceeds the regular deposit insurance. The Comptroller of the Currency 
did not explicitly name the banks that were in fact considered TBTF, but he agreed to 
that the doctrine would encompass the country’s eleven largest banks (O'Hara and 
Shaw 1990).  
 
Rochet and Tirole (1996) as well as Stern and Feldman (2004) emphasise that mere 
size is not the only criteria for qualifying as being TBTF. They present empirical 
evidence that very large institutions, for example Enron, have been allowed to fail, as 
long as they represented little risk of contagion, that is, their level of 
interconnectedness was not sufficient to pose systemic risk. I will refer to both 
institutions that are too big to fail and too interconnected to fail as TBTF, since 
differentiating between the two is not of significance to the analysis in this thesis; 
both kinds of institutions are perceived to pose systemic risk if they are allowed to fall. 
 
4.1.2 Mix it up 
Another broad policy approach defined in the literature is that of constructive 
ambiguity, which essentially is a policy based on creating uncertainty. A formal 
definition of the concept constructive ambiguity is hard to pin down, but an informal 
definition can be found in a G 10 report which states that: 
 
“…any pre-commitment to a particular course of action in support of a financial 
institution should be avoided by the authorities, who should retain discretion as to 
whether, when and under what conditions support would be provided. In addition, 
when making such a decision, it is important to analyze rigorously whether there is a 
systemic threat and, if so, what options there may be for dealing with systemic 
contagion effects in ways that limit the adverse impact on market discipline.” (Group 
of Ten 1997) 
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Hence constructive ambiguity produces uncertainty as to whether intervention will 
take place at all, exactly when it will take place if it does, and what the eventual terms 
of such intervention will be in each individual case. It also allows the government to 
keep all doors open and extend the time frame for decision making, as the decision of 
how to deal with a failing financial institution can be put off until the last minute. 
 
The rationale for keeping the conditions attached to liquidity support ambiguous is to 
keep managers and shareholders uncertain about the cost they would have to bare if 
illiquidity or insolvency should result from imprudent behaviour. The argument goes 
that constructive ambiguity is better than an explicit extension of the “safety net” 
through committing to the TBTF doctrine – through ambiguity one at least succeeds 
in keeping more institutions uncertain about their TBTF-status, increasing market 
discipline.  
 
What first and foremost speaks against the utility of constructive ambiguity is the 
amount of discretion it places in the hands of the ones responsible for crisis 
management. This discretion spurs the time-inconsistency problem: “while it is in the 
interest of the authorities to deny their willingness to provide a safety-net, ex post they 
may later find it optimal to intervene” (Freixas et al. 2002, italics in original). The 
implication is that the authorities according to this rationale can be expected to 
threaten that no safety-net will be provided (or at least abstain from announcing that 
one will be provided), even if this is not their true intention or preference. In addition, 
the lack of transparency inherent in this approach to dealing with a crisis situation 
enables authorities to not be obliged to justify applying different remedies to 
situations perceived as identical to the public (Freixas et al. 2002). 
 
Furthermore, the honeymoon period of the increased market discipline mentioned 
above comes to an end once a bailout occurs (Stern and Feldman 2004). Policymakers 
cannot be expected to act randomly even when constructive ambiguity apparently or 
explicitly drives their policy, hence once government assistance has been delivered to 
one institution, much of the ambiguity has been eliminated, and the market and 
institutions in the market will soon start guessing who is covered and under which 
circumstances (Stern and Feldman 2004). As Charles Goodhart of the London School 
of Economics put it, “This genie cannot be put back in the bottle…Central banks 
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cannot expect in future to enforce good behaviour in bank asset management by some 
constructive ambiguity on whether to withhold liquidity assistance. Their actions have 
spoken louder than words” (Hilsenrath, Reddy and Wessel 2009). 
 
As an analogy to why constructive ambiguity can create suboptimal results, one may 
consider the game of poker: essential in order to become a winning poker player is to 
“mix up your game". What this means is that you shouldn’t always play a hand the 
same way, or act in the same manner every time a given situation occurs. If you do, 
your actions become predictable, as your opponents will observe a pattern and use it 
to their advantage to outplay you in the hand. If you mix up your strategy and play 
identical situations differently, you keep your opponents guessing. This is a winning 
strategy in poker, but not necessarily a winning strategy in dealing with financial 
crises. The reason is that leading your opponents to believe that you always play a 
hand the same way in poker, gives you an edge when you suddenly play the hand 
differently and bust your opponent. In a financial crisis, one of the last things 
government officials want to do is bust their “opponents”. 
 
4.2 Insolvency or illiquidity 
Having explored the broader policy options available for government officials in 
addressing financial institutions in distress, we move on find which concrete actions 
the government can take. However, before the government can decide what kind of 
remedies (if any) it will apply to keep financial institutions from bankruptcy, it needs 
to assess in each case whether it is dealing with illiquid institutions, or insolvent ones. 
The distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is a very difficult one to make, and 
one of much importance for authorities when choosing the path they should take. 
Goodhart (1995) notes that “the time scale required for making a decision as to 
whether to lend to a bank often is too short to allow firm conclusions about its 
solvency”. Hence the possibility always exists that a financial institution which is 
apparently suffering from illiquidity problems (that is basically sound, but temporarily 
experiencing difficulties obtaining access to financing), is in fact insolvent. 
Government officials hence need to establish an opinion on whether the institution in 
question does not have sufficient capital, or is just not able to meet its obligations on 
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time. The implication of this opinion is this: if the government provides financial 
assistance to an illiquid institution, it is in most cases considered a loan. If the 
government provides financial assistance to a financial institution that is known or 
highly likely to be or become insolvent, it is capital provision, i.e. a bailout. 
 
4.3 Liquidity provision 
As we have seen above under the rationale in favour of government intervention, 
liquidity provision by the central bank can be called for under special market 
conditions. With regard to the possibility for Lehman Brothers to borrow from the 
government, prior to Bear Stearns’ bailout in March, the Fed had opened new 
possibilities for lending to non-depository institutions through the discount window 
(Wessel 2009, Moyer 2008). The authority do this was found in Section 13 (3) of the 
Federal reserve Act, providing the Fed with emergency lending powers in “unusual 
and exigent circumstances” (Baxter 2009), a statute that had not been used to lend 
money for 70 years until the 11th of March 2009 when the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) was established. The goal of this facility was to lend Treasury 
securities to financial institutions, taking their mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as 
collateral in an attempt to alleviate the liquidity problems in broker-dealers (Baxter 
2009). 
 
In order to ameliorate the situation after Bear Stearns had been acquired by JP 
Morgan Chase, the Fed opened another lending facility, namely the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF), which could lend dollars against securities. This was also 
done under Section 13 (3), and starting on the 17th of March 2008 primary dealers had 
access to credit from the Federal Reserve through this facility (Baxter 2009). The 
scope of institutions that could borrow from the discount window was hence 
expanded together with the array of collateral that would be considered as approved 
collateral to lend against. 
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Lehman Brothers lent a small amount from the discount window once after the 
creation of the PDCF (Wessel 2009),and later once on the 16th of April for testing 
purposes2 (CNBC 2008). 
 
4.4 Capital provision – Bailout  
There are cases in which the stability of the financial system can be threatened by the 
failure of a bank that is obviously insolvent. During the current financial crisis it 
became apparent as the crisis unfolded that the system was not suffering from lack of 
liquidity, but rather was experiencing a problem of insolvency, which has different 
implications for how the response should be orchestrated (Freixas et al. 2002).  
 
In a situation such as described above it may be better for the authorities to inject 
capital at an early stage than to provide liquidity support on a later stage (Freixas et al. 
2002). The rationale for this is that it may prove cheaper to restructure an insolvent 
bank than to allow it to fail, mainly because the liquidation value of a bank may be 
lower than its market value (James 1991, cited in Freixas et al. 2002). Guttentag and 
Herring (1983, cited in Freixas et al. 2002) make the same point when writing that 
“banks usually are worth more alive than dead even when their net worth alive is 
negative”. This may justify the takeover of bad banks by good banks, and some argue 
that when this cannot be achieved, the public sector should inject money and 
restructure the bad bank as long as the benefits outweigh the costs (Freixas et al. 
2002). In technical terms, what could the government have done in order to keep 
Lehman from failing once it became clear that the investment bank was already or in 
most likelihood soon to be insolvent? 
 
Backstop a merger through issuing a guarantee for toxic assets 
In the bailout of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve created a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) to which it lent approximately $29 billion, whereas it lent $1 billion to JP 
Morgan Chase. Under section 13 (3) the SPV used the loan to acquire the toxic assets 
                                                 
2
 The Fed does not provide information regarding who has accessed the discount window, but does 
inform whether the window has been accessed. If Lehman or any other institution with access had 
borrowed from the discount window while Lehman was presenting quarterly reports with negative 
numbers, the market would assume Lehman was the one borrowing from the discount window, which 
would incur stigma on Lehman. Hence Lehman had reason to be reluctant to access the PDCF. 
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of Bear Stearns, making it “digestible” for JP Morgan Chase. This can be viewed as 
provision of capital support as discussed above. The assets were held as collateral, and 
the time frame of the loan was 10 years. JP Morgan Chase would take the first $1 
billion of potential losses (Baxter 2009).  
 
Provide a direct loan 
The government could also have provided a loan directly to Lehman Brothers, like 
they did with AIG the day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy. In the bailout of AIG, 
the Fed made a two-year loan of up to $85 billion and, in return, received warrants 
that could be converted into common stock, giving the government nearly 80 per cent 
ownership of the insurance company. The entire holding of assets in the company was 
held as collateral against the loan (Andrews, de la Merced and Walsh 2008). 
 
Buy Lehman Shares / Nationalization / Conservatorship 
It is also conceivable that Paulson could have injected capital into Lehman Brothers 
directly. This is in fact what was done with other companies after the TARP 
legislation was signed into law. It is possible that Paulson, in juridical terms, could 
have done this with Lehman Brothers even before the TARP legislation had been 
passed through Congress. 
 
I argue that the option that we most likely would have seen put into place if a bailout 
had occurred, would have been that of backstopping a merger through issuing a 
guarantee for toxic assets, like the bailout for Bear Stearns. I base this on a statement 
by Thomas Baxter, who has been introduced previously in this thesis, that “Plan A 
was to prepare a Bear Stearns-style rescue, plan B was the alternative case” (Ryan 
2009). This means that in the analysis of this thesis, the strategy BAILOUT for the 
government will most of the time result in an arrangement similar to that which was 
put into place for Bear Stearns, as described above. 
  
4.5 Other measures 
Other options to avoid a Lehman bankruptcy were also available for the government, 
like the two presented below. These were, however, options that would have a much 
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higher probability of success if they had been implemented early in the period from 
Bear Stearns’ fall to Lehman’s demise.  
  
Dividing Lehman into one good bank and one bad bank 
Fuld tried to spin off all of Lehman’s commercial and residential real estate positions, 
which were the corporation’s most troubled assets, in a single entity that was going to 
be called SpinCo (McDonald and Robinson 2009). This was supposed to bring down 
Lehman’s exposure to bad assets and bring down its leverage, but the entity could not 
be established until January 2009, four months ahead in time (McDonald and 
Robinson 2009). Additional funding would be required to cover the losses that were 
likely to be incurred on SpinCo if the value of its assets kept deteriorating. This would 
either have to come from the government or the other banks on Wall Street. As seen, 
both declined to backstop a Lehman bad bank. 
 
Converting Lehman Brothers to a bank holding company 
As seen above, this was suggested by Fuld in July 2008, but allegedly stopped by 
Timothy Geithner of the New York Fed. Such a conversion would effectively turn the 
investment bank into a commercial bank, and provide Lehman with the benefit of 
increased access to borrowing from the Fed. It would also allow Lehman to take 
deposits. On the other hand, stronger regulation would be imposed on Lehman, 
restricting their reliance on leverage (Irwin and Appelbaum 2008). Two other Wall 
Street investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, were converted to bank 
holding companies on the 21st of September 2008 (FED 2008). 
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5 Method and data 
In this chapter I present and discuss my choice of method as well as methodological 
issues related to this study. The strengths and weaknesses of my approach will be 
discussed in the following. 
 
5.1 Case study 
This thesis is a case study of the interaction between Lehman Brothers and the US 
government in the period between mid March and mid September 2008. A case study 
is defined by John Gerring as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. A unit is defined as a “spatially 
bounded phenomenon…observed at a single point in time or over some delimited 
period of time” (Gerring 2004: 342). The unit of analysis in this thesis is the 
interaction between Lehman Brothers and the government. The study is of both 
temporal and within-unit variation: According to Gerring’s typology (2004: 343), this 
study is a type III case study, since the primary unit is broken into sub-units (Lehman 
and the government) which are subjected to covariational analysis synchronically and 
diachronically.  
 
Gerring (2004: 347 - 352) presents some general trade-offs that move along seven 
dimensions with regard to case studies. I present each of them in turn and discuss how 
they relate to my thesis, before proceeding with the implications of using game theory 
in the analysis. The first trade-off is between descriptive and causal inference, the first 
being about what? and how?  while the latter deals with the why?. The primary 
motivation for studying the interaction between Lehman and the government in this 
thesis has been to explore what causal relationships lay behind the outcome. However, 
in order to analyze the how one cannot get around understanding the what and the how. 
Although this thesis is fundamentally an attempt to arrive at a causal understanding, 
descriptive aspects make up a large part of the basis for analysis.  
 
The second trade-off is concerned with the scope of proposition, namely breadth 
versus depth: knowing less about more or more about less. Although the introductory 
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chapters place Lehman Brothers in context by adopting a somewhat wider approach, I 
regard this study do be a clear cut case of the latter type.  
 
Trade-off number three deals with case comparability versus representativeness – unit 
homogeneity. Comparability in a single-unit study is by definition likely to be high, 
since all cases are drawn from the same unit. Representativeness, on the other hand, is 
presumably low, since this would require the causal relationship evidenced in the unit 
of analysis to be present also in a larger set of units (Gerring 2004: 348). While the 
stylized presentation of the primary unit of analysis in this thesis increases the 
potential for generalization somewhat, idiosyncrasies inherent in the in-depth study 
may inhibit such effort. Although this is the study of an instance that constitutes part 
of a broader phenomenon (how governments deal with financial institutions in 
distress), I can by no means recommend without reservation that my findings be 
applied to the many other contemporary instances where financial institutions are in 
distress and governments have to decide how to deal with them.  
 
The fourth addresses what kind of insight into causation one can achieve by 
examining empirical evidence of a particular X:Y relationship. The distinction 
presented by Gerring (2004: 348) is between causal effects versus causal mechanisms 
– examining how much Y is affected by a given change in X as opposed to how Y is 
affected by X. On the sub-unit level, this thesis does operate with some estimates of 
how much the actors’ utility from choosing different strategies are affected by certain 
elements, and a critical value of the perception of probabilities is put forward as 
triggering factor for specific outcomes (see chapter 6). With regard to the primary unit, 
however, a proposition is put forth regarding how the policy of constructive ambiguity 
affects Lehman’s choices, which is discussed in chapter 7. In other words what and, 
how much is here regarded as critical in establishing how. 
 
The fifth has to do with the nature of the causal relationship, namely whether it is 
deterministic (invariant) or probabilistic in nature. The causal relationship put forward 
in this stylized study is deterministic in that given a certain set of background 
circumstances (which are necessary and sufficient), a specific outcome will be 
produced. For example, in my analysis, Lehman’s perception of the probability that 
the government will prefer to bail it out should it face bankruptcy has a specific 
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critical value above which Lehman will choose not to sell the company and below 
which it will prefer to sell – a necessary but not sufficient condition in an invariant 
causal relationship.  
 
The sixth trade-off discriminates between exploratory and confirmatory strategies of 
research. My study is exploratory and can hopefully contribute to theory development 
in that it seeks to identify what calculations lead to Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy, 
more concretely the absence of a sale followed by the absence of a bailout. It is also 
theory testing in the sense that it ties the theoretic rationale behind the policy of 
constructive ambiguity to the case of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and evaluates to 
what extent the policy achieved its purpose.  
 
The seventh and last trade-off is concerned with useful variance, and states that the 
study of one unit may be more useful than studying several units that attempt to 
mimic the experimental method with statistical evidence. In other words, not all 
variation is useful variation, and if useful variation is not available, the case study is a 
viable approach (Gerring 2004: 350). Systemically important financial institutions 
that have actually been allowed to go under are a scarcity in the empirical universe, 
therefore an intensive study may be warranted as opposed to a wider cross-unit 
analysis.  
 
5.2 Game theory 
This study’s analysis will rely on game theory. Game theory is an invaluable tool 
when it comes to parsimonious modelling of empirical incidents involving actors who 
act strategically. It constitutes a subfield of Rational Choice (RC) theory, and the 
approach is based on what Tsebelis (1990) names the rationality assumption. This 
holds that human activity is goal oriented and instrumental, and that “individual and 
institutional actors try to maximize their goal achievement”. The focus of game theory 
is set on how actors “choose the means to best gain a set of ends” (Gates and Humes 
1997: 8).  While the concept of rationality is somewhat contested in the literature 
(Green and Shapiro 1994, Gates and Humes 1997, Hovi 1998, Tsebelis 1990), the 
central and mainly uncontested areas that RC encompasses are utility maximization, 
structuring of preferences, decision making under conditions of uncertainty and, on a 
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broader basis, the centrality of individuals in the explanation of outcomes (Green and 
Shapiro 1994). The basic orientation of game theory is to develop general 
explanations, that is identifying equilibrium conditions in order to develop hypotheses 
about how the world works, or to test competing empirical models  (Gates and Humes 
1997). This case study differs from these orientations, as it primarily utilizes game 
theory as a guidance for gaining a better understanding of an empirical event. 
However, as stated above, the findings from this thesis will be applicable to other 
units of analysis, given that the caveats posed in the analysis hold. 
 
A game, according to Gates and Humes (1997: 1) “involves situations in which 
individuals are aware that their actions affect one another.” Game theory is thus 
utilized to study the strategic interaction between actors. Munck defines game theory 
along the same lines, as “the branch of RCT that studies interdependent decision 
making with a formal methodology” (Munck 2001: 173). It is especially the ability to 
potentially perform rigorous and precise empirical analysis that is appealing with 
game theoretical analysis (Gates and Humes 1997).  
 
Technically, a game is built on three parts – the actors, their strategies and the payoffs 
each player attaches to any combination of the players’ strategies (Luce and Raiffa 
1989). The actors or players in a game are the ones who make decisions. In addition 
to the actors, nature can be introduced as a non-player at any stage in a game, making 
chance moves (Hovi 1998). Strategies are plans that prescribe the action for any 
situation in which the player can make a decision. Strategy has the same meaning as 
action in a game (Hovi 1998). The payoffs are attached to the different outcomes, and 
can be presented as ordinal- or interval scale rankings – the former will be applied in 
this thesis. In addition to the technical parts of the game pointed out by Luce and 
Raiffa (1989), the rules of the game include a specification of the sequence of moves 
and what information is available to each player when each decision is made (Hovi 
1998, Gates and Humes 1997). The more technical game theoretical aspects will be 
dealt with when required in the analysis. 
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5.3 Data 
This thesis relies heavily on secondary sources for its empirical account, more 
specifically qualitative document analysis of newspapers (both online and printed 
editions), press releases, speeches, reports, public hearings and books. Speeches and 
press releases have been collected directly from the web pages of the Federal Reserve, 
the Treasury and Lehman Brother’s home pages. Material from hearings that have 
been conducted after Lehman Brother’s demise has been gathered from their 
preliminary transcripts from the US House of Representatives3. These transcripts have 
been checked against actual video recordings of the hearings in order to confirm their 
accuracy. Commentary and analysis has been gathered from news sources like the 
New York Times, Bloomberg.com, BBC news, Reuters, CNN Money, Financial 
Times and the Wall Street Journal. When referring to news articles, the journalists’ 
names have been used in the references in order to better distinguish between 
references from various issues of the same news source. Transcripts from interviews 
have also been used where available. Below I discuss the implications of using 
secondary sources for academic work. 
 
By definition, secondary sources have indirect knowledge, meaning that they rely on 
primary sources or other secondary sources for information (Rozakis 2007). 
Newspapers and books are secondary sources that can constitute very useful research 
devices, insomuch as the researcher is critical with regard to whether the author’s 
account is coloured by her own view or agenda (Grønmo 2004). In addition, 
newspapers and books are much more readily available than for instance potential 
interview objects, and are invaluable in the study of recent events that have not yet 
reached historical records. Crucial when relying on secondary sources for academic 
work is to be critical of the sources’ reliability (Bechhofer and Paterson 2000). The 
fact that this thesis deals with a relatively recent event demands even more from the 
researcher in terms of assessing the reliability of the sources, since uninformed views 
may be prematurely released from otherwise reliable sources. When determining a 
source’s reliability two points in particular must be addressed: quality and bias. 
 
                                                 
3
 Preliminary transcripts have been used as sources, as final versions are not as of yet available. 
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The first issue with regard to quality is to ensure that the writer knows what he is 
talking about (Rozakis 2007). When using renowned newspapers like the New York 
Times as a source, one assumes that the journalists have insight into what they are 
writing about, however this may not always be the case. How well the author 
documents his claims is a crucial element in assessing the quality of a source. 
 
One special trait of this study has been that many of the sources referred to in books 
and newspapers are anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the topics. This means 
that the author does not provide any way to identify the primary source, except claim 
that the source was “familiar with the process”, “close to Mr. X”, “present at the 
meeting” etc. These sources are often also exclusively cited by one specific author or 
journalist, in all likelihood because their integrity is dependent on them protecting 
their sources. In these situations, a researcher has to be very critical of the journalist or 
author’s credibility and record. Is there anything known about the author that would 
give him an incentive to portray the story in a particular manner4? What is the writer’s 
reputation? Does the essence of the story match other accounts of the events, or are 
there discrepancies?  
 
With regard to bias, “Every source is biased, because every source has a point of 
view” (Rozakis 2007: 76). However, bias is not necessarily a bad thing as long as it is 
taken into account when evaluating a source. Journalists and novelists may for 
instance have an incentive to put a quote in a context where it does not belong or in 
support of something that would not be acknowledged by the person quoted if it fits 
the agenda of the author. Thus it becomes crucially important to cross-check, do 
background checks and be critical what the author may have to gain from saying what 
she says. Being aware of these potential pitfalls when relying on secondary sources 
makes the reliability of the research output all the better. 
 
Summing up this chapter, this thesis is a case study that utilizes game theory as a tool 
in presenting a stylized version of the interaction between Lehman Brothers and the 
                                                 
4
 If a commentator has any connection, personal or professional, to the subject of the story there is 
reason to be particularly suspicious. For instance when considering “insider stories” like that of 
Lawrence G. McDonald and Patrick Robinson’s book A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The 
Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers one has to take into consideration the authors’ 
incentives to portray the stories in a particular manner (protecting former colleagues who are personal 
friends, portray enemies in a bad light etc.). 
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government. The primary goal is to be able to better understand the outcome that was 
observed. The empirical material has in large part been collected through qualitative 
assessment of secondary sources. In the following chapter I will put the methods and 
critical assessment of sources to use. 
 
6 Analysis 
In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate how Lehman’s actions are contingent on 
how they perceive the government’s preferences and capabilities. I will start with 
presenting the players of the game, the strategies available to them, and the sequence 
in which the game is played. This analysis will be based on a stylized presentation of 
the events that occurred around Lehman’s bankruptcy.  
 
Secondly, the stylized game will present the payoffs that the players attribute to the 
different outcomes as ordinal values, meaning that I will state that player X values 
outcome Y over outcome Z, but not by how much player X values outcome Y over Z. 
By presenting a stylized version of the interaction between the government and 
Lehman Brothers I make explicit the principal strategies that were available to the 
players, and present how the players would choose between these strategies after 
estimating the payoffs attributed to the different outcomes.  
 
6.1 The game 
The event we are studying is a sequential game between two players. The period of 
analysis starts right after Bear Stearns has been bailed out by the government on the 
17th of March 2008, and ends with Lehman filing for bankruptcy the morning of the 
15th of September 2008. The second cut-off point is obvious, while the first requires 
explanation: The focus on Lehman from commentators and agents in the financial 
markets increased dramatically after Bear Stearns’ bailout, primarily because Lehman 
was perceived to be similar to Bear Stearns and potentially next in line to run into 
trouble. In addition, the bailout of Bear Stearns was a crucial event with regard to 
Lehman’s strategic reasoning throughout the stylized game that is presented in this 
analysis. 
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6.1.1 Actors 
For Lehman Brothers, chief executive officer Dick Fuld was the one making the 
ultimate decisions as to what direction should be taken and what strategies were 
sought during the period in question. Fuld did of course have the rest of the Lehman 
management and his board of directors to weigh in on the decisions, but ultimately, he 
was the one who made the calls.  
 
Although other individuals and groups clearly were involved in the process, Bernanke 
and Paulson were no doubt the two with the most weight from the government’s side 
when it came to deciding the fate of Lehman Brothers.  
 
One can argue that the preferences of Ben Bernanke and Henry Paulson should not be 
portrayed as unison, since the two may have had diverging preferences. From the 
material I have studied for this thesis, the two have not, however,  openly displayed 
differences in opinion regarding policy, nor implementation of policy during the 
period in question; hence I treat them as acting in unison. Before explaining the 
strategies available for the players, let us for the sake of convenience have a look at 
what the extensive form of the stylized game I will base my analysis on looks like: 
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Figure 3: The game structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Strategies and outcomes 
In the stylized game, Fuld gets to act first, and can choose whether or not to sell 
Lehman Brothers. If Lehman chooses the strategy SELL, the outcome will be a sale of 
the company or parts of it, which means that Lehman’s business will most likely be 
furthered, but under or together with another company. If Lehman chooses the 
strategy NOT SELL, the government can respond by playing strategy DEMISE or 
BAILOUT, signifying Lehman bankruptcy and Lehman bailout, respectively. In the 
stylized game I have excluded the potential outcome where Lehman does not sell, but 
still survives without government intervention, although there is a real possibility that 
Lehman will be able to survive as an independent company. Including this outcome in 
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the game would mean that we would have to allow Nature to move after Lehman 
plays strategy NOT SELL to decide whether Lehman will survive or not. This would 
make the game unnecessarily complicated, as Lehman’s perception of this factor is 
captured in Lehman’s payoff for “continued operation”, as will be explained below.  
 
The game has three potential outcomes – Sale which consists of strategy sequence 
{SELL, -}, meaning that Lehman or parts of it is sold in the market, breaching 
Lehman’s independence; Demise {NOT SELL, DEMISE} which means that Lehman 
files for bankruptcy; or Bailout {NOT SELL, BAILOUT} which means that the 
government provides financial assistance in order to facilitate Lehman’s survival. 
 
We know that the outcome of this game was in fact, as shown in Figure 2, Demise. 
Before analyzing how this outcome was arrived at, we need to establish that the 
alternative outcomes that I present in this game were in fact real possibilities, meaning 
that the players indeed had the opportunity to act differently if they preferred.  
 
 
Table 1: Potential outcomes 
 
Strategy sequence Outcome 
{SELL, } Sale 
{NOT SELL, DEMISE} Demise 
{NOT SELL, BAILOUT} Bailout 
 
6.2 Examining the counterfactual 
For this to be a meaningful analysis, we first have to establish whether Lehman indeed 
had the opportunity to find a market solution if they preferred this over a bailout or 
bankruptcy and second, whether the government did indeed have the power to rescue 
Lehman if they preferred a bailout over bankruptcy. Since neither of these 
assessments is uncontroversial or readily arrived at, we need to take some time to 
investigate the possibility of the counterfactual. What we need to establish is the 
following: Was Lehman free to choose strategy SELL if they had preferred the 
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outcome Sale? And, could the government have chosen strategy BAILOUT as a 
response to strategy NOT SELL if they had preferred Bailout to be the outcome? 
 
6.2.1 Could Lehman Brothers have found a solution? 
There is much debate as to whether or not Mr. Fuld and his colleagues in the Lehman 
Brothers management did in fact do all in their power to rescue Lehman from getting 
to the point where the only two remaining options were bankruptcy or financial 
assistance from the government to facilitate a merger. Since we know with the benefit 
of hindsight that the outcome was bankruptcy, if Lehman did indeed try every 
possibility to save the company and still ultimately failed, there are no grounds for 
claiming that Lehman could have found a solution even if they wanted to.  
 
In Fuld’s own words before the House of Representatives in the hearing of October 6th: 
“As the environment changed, we took numerous actions to reduce our risk. We 
strengthened our balance sheet, reduced leverage, improved liquidity, closed our 
mortgage origination businesses and reduced our exposure to troubled assets. We also 
raised over $l0 billion in new capital. We explored converting to a bank holding 
company. We looked at a wide range of strategic alternatives, including spinning off 
our commercial real estate assets to our shareholders. We also considered selling part 
or all of the company. We approached many potential investors, but in a market 
paralyzed by a crisis in confidence none of these discussions came to fruition. Indeed, 
contrary to what you may have read, I never turned down an offer to buy Lehman 
Brothers” (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2008). This latter 
statement clearly runs counter to what other commentators, including Lehman 
officials, have allegedly uttered. 
 
To recap and expand on the introductory chapter of this thesis, Mr. Fuld had been 
searching for investors to buy a 5 to 10 per cent share of the company in the market 
since 2006: He was in contact with the Chinese company Citic Group, Kuwait’s 
sovereign wealth fund and Martin J. Sullivan, the then chief executive of the 
insurance giant AIG, in the latter case allegedly looking to sell the entire company 
(Plummer 2008, Onaran and Helyar 2008, Sorkin 2008a). 
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In July 2008 talks were initiated with Bank of America. Fuld contacted General 
Electrics’ CEO Jeffrey R. Immelt,  and made an overture to HSBC Holding Plc based 
in London, none of which resulted in a sale (Onaran and Helyar 2008). Mid 2008 Fuld 
was also in contact with the Korean Development Bank (KDB) which was, according 
to Fuld in his testimony before the US House of Representatives, only one of five 
banks in consortium wanting to buy up a 50 per cent share of Lehman in the market. 
The conversations had allegedly been going on for months. When asked in the hearing 
if this was the kind of arrangement Fuld was looking for at the time, he answered “I 
would have welcomed that transaction, yes, sir” (Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 2008). However, Fuld also stated in his testimony before the 
House of Representatives that it was not so much him actively engaging in selling 
parts of the company; it was rather a matter of the KDB seeking to buy a share of 
Lehman. This was in early August, one and a half months before Lehman filed for 
bankruptcy. Fuld allegedly refused the offer, never presenting it to the board of 
directors at Lehman (McDonald and Robinson 2009). 
 
Sources close to Fuld have allegedly claimed that Fuld did not act in accordance with 
the severity of the situation when it came to finding a buyer for Lehman Brothers 
(Fishman 2008, Anderson and White 2008). “Dick was so proud of Lehman that he 
was slow to recognize that others didn’t share that belief” (George L. Ball, friend of 
Fuld, cited in Onaran and Helyar 2008). Chairman Waxman in the Congressional 
Hearing where Fuld testified stated in his introductory remarks that “One internal 
analysis reveals that Lehman saw warning signs, but did not move early/fast enough, 
and lacked discipline about capital allocation” (Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 2008). Furthering this notion, Bank of America, when 
negotiating for a deal to take over Lehman Brothers, allegedly reported after having 
gone through its books that Lehman was carrying assets worth $25 billion less than 
what Lehman claimed they were worth (Wessel 2009). 
 
Paulson on his side allegedly uttered that he found Fuld to be unrealistically optimistic 
in how he tried to find a solution for Lehman (Wessel 2009). He also complained in 
interviews with the New York Times and Charlie Rose after Lehman’s bankruptcy 
filing that he had been urging Mr. Fuld to find a buyer for Lehman. According to 
Brookly McLaughlin, a Treasury spokeswoman, Paulson “spoke to Fuld quite often” 
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between April and September, talks which according to Fuld were allegedly about 
Paulson encouraging him to find a strategic buyer for Lehman (Onaran and Helyar 
2008). Further underscoring the point, Nocera and Andrews wrote in the Herald 
Tribune that Paulson was frustrated with what he perceived as Fuld’s foot-dragging 
(2008b), referring to his lack of urgency to find a buyer for the company. 
 
As we have seen, Fuld was busy approaching potential buyers for Lehman Brothers. 
However, no deal was sealed, and some regarded the absence of a solution as 
resulting from a lack of urgency and willingness to sell from Fuld’s side. The 
evidence indicates that Fuld could have found a solution for Lehman in the market if 
he wanted to. Is there a motive for such behaviour from Fuld? 
 
I have argued that Fuld did not try his best to sell Lehman Brothers, meaning that Fuld 
could have sold if he wanted to, but chose not to. This strategy could potentially have 
two different explanations, each producing roughly the same outcome: 
 
The first potential explanation is that he had an inappropriate perception of how much 
his company was worth, and was demanding too much for it. A second potential 
explanation to why there was no sale is that Fuld believed the Government would 
come to the rescue as they had done with Bear Stearns if Lehman were to find itself in 
a position of imminent collapse, and that the possibility of such assistance made it 
more attractive for Lehman Brothers not to sell than to sell. If Fuld believed that 
bankruptcy was not his worst case scenario, but rather a government bailout, this 
would provide him with an incentive not to sell.  
 
6.2.2 Could the government have bailed out Lehman Brothers? 
Another central prerequisite for the analysis in this thesis to have merit, is that the 
government did indeed have room to manoeuvre, meaning that they did in fact 
possess the powers and the means to provide Lehman Brothers with financial 
assistance to facilitate a merger or otherwise contribute financially to their survival. If 
the answer to this question is no, the government then had no option but to let Lehman 
Brothers go under, rendering my analysis unwarranted. 
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As seen previously in this thesis, the Federal Reserve augmented the alternatives 
available for the central bank unprecedentedly with the marriage of Section 13 (3) and 
the SPV conducted when Bear Stearns was bailed out. With the new practice the Fed 
could inject liquidity in individual non-depository institutions5. 
 
There is no doubt government could come up with large sums of money quickly; this 
was shown both with Bear Stearns and Fannie and Freddie before, and with AIG 
immediately after the weekend in September that sealed Lehman’s fate. The main 
argument from both Bernanke and Paulson as to why they did not commit government 
money to facilitate a Lehman takeover by another financial institution is that the law 
did not permit them to do so – the Fed could only lend to non-bank financial 
institutions against good enough assets to serve as collateral. This can, however, be 
viewed as a way of doctoring the story post facto. As one commentator who was 
involved with both the Bear Stearns rescue and the Lehman Brothers failure stated, 
“They could have found a way to save Lehman” (Fishman 2008). 
 
The focus on the impaired collateral as the main obstacle to committing money is 
seriously contested: for instance bankers involved with Lehman, according to Nocera 
and Andrews in their article in the New York Times “Struggling to Keep Up as the 
Crisis Raced on” (2008a), claim that they “do not recall Mr. Paulson talking about 
Lehman’s impaired collateral” when officials from the Federal reserve inspected 
Lehman’s books before the bankruptcy. 
 
Paulson further said in the White House press room Monday morning after Lehman 
had declared bankruptcy that “I never once considered it appropriate to put taxpayer 
money on the line…in resolving Lehman Brothers” (Wessel 2009: 23), a statement 
signalling reluctance more than inability. Bernanke likewise stated before the US 
Senate that “In the case of Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank, the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury declined to commit public funds to support the 
institution.  The failure of Lehman posed risks.  But the troubles at Lehman had been 
well known for some time, and investors clearly recognized…that the failure of the 
firm was a significant possibility.  Thus, we judged that investors and counterparties 
                                                 
5
 SPVs were later established to take toxic assets off AIG’s balance sheet in a manner much similar to 
how this was executed with Bear Stearns (Baxter 2009) 
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had had time to take precautionary measures” (Bernanke 2008a). This statement bears 
witness of the same notion of unwillingness, not inability. To conclude regarding the 
capability of the Fed, the Federal Reserve could have set up an SPV in the same 
manner as they did with Bear Stearns in order to backstop a merger between Lehman 
Brothers and one of its potential buyers within the limits of their authorities and given 
their previous actions during the crisis. The other measures outlined previously in this 
thesis could also have been applied somewhere between Stage 1 and Stage 2 of the 
game we are analyzing here, as will be discussed in further length later. There is little 
doubt Paulson in particular was very reluctant to put tax-payer dollars on the line to 
rescue Lehman, but the evidence shows that not bailing out Lehman Brothers was 
more likely a matter of unwillingness than a lack of capability.  
 
6.3 Solving the stylized game  
Having established that all strategies in the game were in fact open to the players and 
all outcomes possible had the players preferred and been able to converge, we can 
proceed to the analysis of the player’s preferences and their interaction. Determining 
what strategies the players will choose in any given situation is the payoff attributed 
to the outcome each player believes the chosen strategy will yield. Building on 
chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis, let us first have a look at what factors are likely to have 
been taken into the equation by Lehman and the government when estimating their 
payoffs. In the spirit of backward induction, I will start with the last player to act, 
namely the government. 
 
6.3.1 The government’s payoffs 
In the game, the government has to decide whether it believes that the cost of bailing 
out Lehman Brothers exceeds the benefit Lehman produces for the well-functioning 
of the financial system and macroeconomic stability – Lehman’s systemic importance 
(si), meaning what damage would be inflicted on the US financial system in the event 
of a Lehman failure. When determining the cost of bailing out Lehman Brothers, the 
government has to evaluate the economical cost of the bailout (ec), the political cost 
of the bailout (pc) and the moral hazard inflicted on the system by a bailout (mh). 
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These three factors constitute the cost of bailing out Lehman in the stylized game 
presented here. Table 2 summarizes the elements that make up the payoffs. 
 
 
Table 2: Explanation of the elements constituting the government’s payoffs 
 
Explanation Element 
Lehman’s systemic importance si 
Economical cost of bailout ec 
Political cost of bailout pc 
Moral hazard inflicted on financial system from bailout mh 
 
 
The government’s payoff associated with the outcome Demise, meaning that Lehman 
as player one and the first player to act chooses strategy NOT SELL and the 
government responds by playing strategy DEMISE, is [–si] since the government does 
not suffer the costs associated with a bailout, but loses the value Lehman poses for the 
well-being of the financial system. The payoff attributed to outcome Sale which ends 
the game without the government responding to Lehman’s action, gives the 
government payoff (0) since it keeps Lehman’s business afloat without any costs for 
the government, preserving status quo for the financial system. The payoff attributed 
to the outcome Bailout is 0 – (ec + pc + mh), meaning that the government keeps the 
value Lehman poses for the financial system and macroeconomic stability (it does not 
suffer [-si]) minus the economic and political costs as well as the moral hazard that 
come with a bailout. These payoffs will be summarized in Table 4 together with 
Lehman’s payoffs. 
 
6.3.2 Lehman’s payoffs 
I argue that Lehman’s sole concern in the game is to achieve the highest possible price 
for the company if it cannot proceed as an independent concern. Of course there are 
other considerations that would play into Fuld’s decision on whether or not to sell; I 
still argue that these are subordinate to the price Fuld can achieve for himself and the 
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shareholders. As mentioned, the expected value of Lehman continuing as an 
independent concern is included in the payoff from the outcome Sale.  
 
Payoff (pb) is Lehman’s estimate of the price it will obtain for its shares in a Bailout. 
Payoff (ps) is the price Lehman believe it will get if the company is sold in the market, 
and (co) is the expected value Lehman attribute to the continued operation of the 
company, hence the payoff from outcome Sale becomes (ps – co). If the outcome is 
Demise, this gives Lehman payoff (d).  
 
 
Table 3: Explanation of the elements constituting Lehman’s payoffs 
 
Explanation Element 
Benefit from bailout pb 
Benefit from sale ps 
Expected value of continued operation co 
Benefit from bankruptcy d 
 
Lehman is as stated player one in the game, meaning that they get to act first. If 
Lehman believes that the government will choose strategy BAILOUT if Lehman 
chooses strategy NOT SELL, Lehman will play strategy NOT SELL if they perceive 
payoff (pb) to be greater than payoff (ps – co). If Lehman believes that the 
government will choose strategy DEMISE if Lehman plays strategy NOT SELL, or if 
Lehman estimates that (pb) is smaller than (ps – co), Lehman will choose to play 
strategy SELL. This way Lehman’s choice of strategy is contingent upon its 
perception of how the government will respond to its actions, and how they assess the 
value of a bailout (pb) compared to the price they can obtain for Lehman in the 
market minus the value of continued operations (ps – co). In Table 4 I present the 
payoffs attributed to the different outcomes by both players. 
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Table 4: The actors’ payoffs 
 
Outcome Payoff Lehman Payoff Government 
Sale (ps – co) 0 
Bailout (pb) 0 – (ec + pc + mh) 
Demise 0 (-si) 
 
6.3.3 Introducing Nature and incomplete information 
As seen, the government abides to the policy of constructive ambiguity during the 
period of time we are analyzing. This means that the government does not give any 
clear signals to financial institutions as to whether or not they can expect the 
government to step in and rescue them should they face bankruptcy. The implication 
for Lehman Brothers is that it cannot know for certain whether the government will 
bail it out or not if they choose strategy NOT SELL and end up facing bankruptcy – 
the government cannot be expected to express whether it will prefer to bail Lehman 
out over letting it go bankrupt (TYPE A), or let it go under instead of bailing it out 
(TYPE B). Furthermore, even if such an announcement was made, the time 
inconsistency problem inherent through the discretion that comes with the policy of 
constructive ambiguity allows the government to eventually act counter to its 
announced preference when the time for decision comes. Lehman thus in practical as 
well as game theoretical terms has incomplete information to guide its decision of 
which strategy to play. The probability (p) in Figure 3 below denominates the 
probability Lehman attaches to the government being of TYPE A, while the 
probability (p – 1) is attached to the likelihood that the government is of TYPE B. The 
government on the other hand knows at all times which type they are. 
 
Before presenting the arguments behind the ranking of preferences, let’s have a look 
at what the stylized game looks like in extensive form with the payoffs and 
incomplete information introduced. The dotted line between Lehman’s decision nodes 
signifies that when Lehman is to act, it does not know whether Nature has chosen the 
government to be of TYPE A or of TYPE B.  
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Figure 4: The stylized game with payoffs and incomplete information 
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Nature is a “non-player who makes chance moves at some stage in the game” (Hovi 
1998). In the game that is played between the government and Lehman Brothers, 
nature first makes a chance move and decides whether the government is of TYPE A 
or of TYPE B. In accordance with the above, the government is TYPE A if it holds 
the following to be true, meaning that the government prefers Bailout over Demise: 
 
si > (ec + pc + mh) 
 
On the other hand, if the government is of TYPE B, it holds the following to be true 
and will prefer outcome Demise over outcome Bailout: 
 
si < (ec + pc + mh) 
 
The “random” decision is made by Nature in accordance with a probability 
distribution that can be estimated by the players (Rasmusen 2007). When we examine 
the players’ preferences below, we will see that Lehman’s decision regarding which 
strategy to play depends on its perception of which type of government it is facing, i.e. 
the value of p in Figure 3. The way for Lehman to deal with this uncertainty is to 
estimate the expected utility from playing each of its available strategies taking the 
fact that it may be facing wither one of the two types of government into account. 
Once Lehman determine the expected utility of both strategies, it can calculate which 
value p has to take for it to be more beneficial for Lehman to play strategy NOT 
SELL than strategy SELL, and vice versa. Before we can move to this point of the 
analysis, we need to establish what the players’ preferences are, meaning how the 
players rank the different outcomes in ordinal terms.  
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6.3.4 Ordinal ranking of preferences 
 
The government 
As we have seen above, the government’s preference is determined by its assessment 
of Lehman’s systemic importance weighed against the costs of bailing it out. With the 
benefit of hindsight, we know that the government was TYPE B6, since a TYPE A 
government would not choose strategy DEMISE as a response to Lehman’s strategy 
NOT SELL. However, to be able to portray how the government looked from 
Lehman’s point of view, we need to assess how the government was most likely to 
consider the proposed elements. Which values did the government attribute to them? 
One first step is to look at statements by Paulson and Bernanke. The explanation by 
the two following the demise of Lehman Brothers as to why they did not intervene has 
nothing to do with either of the elements I have put forward in this thesis as the basis 
for their decision. However, the statements do say something about their estimate of 
Lehman’s systemic importance:  
 
Paulson and Bernanke’s stated reason as to why they did not rescue Lehman Brothers 
is that they did not have the powers to do so because of Lehman’s impaired collateral 
(Nocera and Andrews 2008a, Thomas and Hirsh 2009, Bernanke 2008b, Wessel 
2009). The exact words of Chairman Bernanke in an interview with 60 Minutes on the 
topic of Lehman’s demise were: "There were many people who said, let 'em fail. You 
know, it is not a problem. The markets will take care of it. And I think I knew better 
than that. And Lehman proved that you cannot let a large internationally active firm 
fail in the middle of a financial crisis. Now was it a mistake? It wasn't a mistake for 
the following reason: we didn't have the option, we didn't have the tools. All the 
Federal Reserve can do is make loans against collateral" (transcript from CNBC 2009). 
The way Bernanke presents it in this interview, he leaves no doubt that he would 
prefer to rescue Lehman if he had had the powers.  
 
Paulson uttered the same notion according to the New York Times, telling 
interviewers that if he had had the money before (referring to the $700bn that was 
made available after TARP passed through Congress), he might have been able to 
                                                 
6
 There are some reservations attached to the assumption that the government was TYPE B throughout 
the entire period studied here. This will be discussed in chapter 7. 
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save Lehman (Fishman 2008). These statements both convey the same message – 
Lehman was systemically important, and would have been rescued had the 
government possessed the powers to do so. I have already discussed the role of 
Lehman’s collateral, and concluded that they could have surpassed this obstacle if 
they had wanted to. 
 
Paulson and Bernanke’s statements aside, what was the notion elsewhere about 
Lehman’s systemic importance? With the benefit of hindsight, Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco President Janet Yellen stated in a speech in New York on the 16th of 
April 2009 that “Lehman was a systemically important institution” and that its 
bankruptcy caused the crisis to take a “quantum leap in terms of seriousness” (McKee 
and Chen 2009). She would not call the lack of government financial intervention a 
clear error, but she went far in insinuating that more should have been done in order to 
avoid a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (McKee and Chen 2009). Christine Lagarde, 
France’s finance minister, did not stop at insinuating, calling the decision to let 
Lehman die “a genuine error” (Sorkin 2008c) right after Lehman’s bankruptcy was 
announced in September 2008. 
 
Observing the disruptions in the financial markets after Lehman’s demise, there is no 
doubt that Lehman was in fact a systemically important financial institution. 
Estimations of how the government deemed the level of its systemic importance are 
difficult to assert, especially taking into consideration the government’s incentive to 
keep this a secret, as seen previously in this thesis. However, potentially subtracting 
from the government’s assessment of Lehman’s systemic importance was the 
outspoken notion on the part of Bernanke and Paulson that the markets had had time 
to prepare for a Lehman bankruptcy (Wessel 2009), hence leaving them better 
prepared to cope with Lehman going under than they would have been if Bear Stearns 
had been allowed to fail. Systemic importance is such a composite measure that I will 
not treat the time element individually, but include it in the estimate of (si). If the 
government really gave this aspect merit, Lehman’s systemic importance would be 
lowered as time passed, since the market would be constantly better prepared.  
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The economical cost of bailing out Lehman 
Government lending of any kind to financial institutions is potentially costly due to 
the risk that the loan will never be repaid or that the collateral held against the loan 
loses its value and the institution becomes insolvent. The risk is difficult to avoid for 
the government – for instance the economic situation may deteriorate in the aftermath 
of an institution receiving assistance, meaning that although having been solvent at 
the time assistance was given, it may become insolvent after (Freixas, Giannini, 
Hoggarth and Soussa 2000). In the specific case of Lehman Brothers we have seen 
that unconfirmed sources claimed Bank of America wanted the government to 
guarantee for $65 billion of Lehman’s toxic assets. If this was the case and assistance 
was provided, the government could potentially lose the entire amount if the assets 
lost their value completely. On the other hand, the assets could increase in value, 
yielding a profit. As seen, the government drew much focus to Lehman’s impaired 
collateral as a reason why no bailout could be effectuated. Poor collateral would 
increase the risk of the government suffering losses; however the focus on the 
impaired collateral is likely to have been exaggerated. The government was in any 
case likely to suffer economical losses from a bailout, the extent to which I will not go 
further in estimating beyond claiming that the losses could potentially become 
substantial. 
 
Political cost for Paulson and Bernanke  
With regard to the political cost, the pressure on Bernanke and Paulson for the Fed’s 
activist role after the rescue of Bear Stearns had been immense (Wessel 2009). The 
political will for a bailout of Lehman was probably further decreased after Fannie and 
Freddy were bailed out just over a week before Lehman’s bankruptcy. Even though 
the government considered Lehman systemically important (especially in the midst of 
a financial crisis where every financial institution of some size and interconnectedness 
would be considered of systemic importance), the political costs attributed to a bailout 
was likely to increase for every bailout that was undertaken. Wessel claims in his 
book In Fed we Trust (2009: 14) that Paulson stated in a conference call with 
Bernanke and Geithner that “I’m being called Mr. Bailout…I can’t do it again” before 
the weekend Lehman filed for bankruptcy. This supports the view that the political 
cost of a bailout increases with the magnitude of bailouts that have been provided. 
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Moral Hazard 
From the theoretical discussion of moral hazard we can expect that the level of moral 
hazard among financial institutions will also rise every time a new bailout occurs. As 
argued elsewhere in this thesis, it is especially the government’s bailout of Bear 
Stearns that increases the incentive for Lehman to expect a bailout to be forthcoming 
during the period we are analyzing here. If the government had let Bear Stearns fail, 
Lehman would have had to estimate the possibility of a bailout to be lower than what 
was the case after having seen Bear bailed out. Hence, other financial institutions 
could be expected to reason in the same manner should the government bail out 
Lehman Brothers – moral hazard would undoubtedly rise. 
 
Having explored Lehman’s significance for the financial system and the costs that 
would follow a government bailout, we are far from able to present any rigid 
assessment of the margins that separate the government’s preference ranking of the 
different outcomes. However, we can say something about the ordinal ranking of the 
outcomes. 
 
The only outcome that does not incur any costs on the government is Sale, meaning 
that Sale is the government’s most preferred outcome since both Bailout and Demise 
pose costs for the government. From the assessments above, we cannot assert with 
any kind of certainty which of these two latter outcomes the government preferred 
more during the period of this analysis. The reason for this is that even though sources 
claim that Paulson was encouraging Fuld to sell Lehman, this is compatible with what 
I have established above – Sale being the government’s most preferred outcome. It 
does not say anything about the government’s preference regarding the outcomes 
Demise and Sale. If one should assign weight to Paulson’s statement that he never 
considered bailing out Lehman Brothers, one would have to conclude that Demise 
was the government’s second most preferred outcome. However, Paulson contradicts 
himself when stating that he would have saved Lehman if he had the powers, which 
was also the statement from Bernanke. The fact that we only with the benefit of 
hindsight are able to establish how the government ranked their preferences proves 
that the policy of constructive ambiguity was a great success with regard to keeping 
financial institutions guessing.  
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The ranking of the preferred outcomes for the government was as in TYPE B as 
follows: 
 
Sale > Demise > Bailout 
 
Lehman  
 
Since it is difficult to say anything meaningful as an observer about how Lehman 
estimated the relationship between the two payoffs, I will take Lehman’s actions to be 
indicative of its preferences. This is in line with my previous argument in this thesis 
that Lehman could sell if it wanted to. Hence, the empirical observation that there was 
no sale I take to mean that Lehman estimated the payoff from a bailout to be higher 
than the payoff from a sale in the market minus the value of continued operation [(pb) 
> (ps – co)] and played strategy NOT SELL. Furthermore, for Lehman to play this 
strategy, it must have estimated the likelihood of the government responding to 
strategy NOT SELL by playing strategy BAILOUT (i.e. the government being of 
TYPE A) to justify playing this strategy. This will be explained under dealing with 
uncertainty below. 
 
While the outcome Demise gives Lehman a payoff of 0, both outcomes Bailout and 
Sale provide Lehman with a positive payoff, taking for granted that neither would 
provide Lehman with some kind of benefit as opposed to bankruptcy. From the 
empirical observation I derive that Lehman ranked the outcomes in the following 
preferred order: 
 
Bailout > Sale > Demise 
 
To achieve their highest payoff, Lehman has to play strategy NOT SELL. However 
both Demise and Bailout can be the outcome of Lehman playing this strategy. This 
means that Lehman has to estimate what they believe the government will do as a 
response to Lehman playing strategy NOT SELL. If Lehman plays strategy SELL the 
government does not act, and the outcome is immediately Sale. On the other hand, by 
playing strategy NOT SELL, the government decides the fate of Lehman. The way for 
Lehman to establish what strategy will provide the highest payoff under conditions of 
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incomplete information, is to take both potential outcomes of playing strategy NOT 
SELL into consideration, and determine the expected utility of playing this strategy 
compared to playing strategy SELL.  
 
6.3.5 Pretending complete information 
How would the game be solved if the players acted under complete information? By 
figuring this out we can determine what the equilibria would have been if Lehman 
knew that it was faced with a government TYPE A or B, meaning what would have 
been the optimal sequence of strategies for both players to achieve the highest 
common payoff. We remove uncertainty by taking Nature out of the game and 
allowing Lehman to know before moving whether the government is TYPE A or B. 
We solve a game of complete information by identifying the Nash equilibrium(s), a 
set of strategies from which none of the players have an incentive to unilaterally 
deviate. The way to solve this game through backward induction is by first 
determining what is the optimal choice of strategy for the last player to make a move 
in the game, and then we do the same for the next-to-last player, but with this player 
we take the selected action by the last player as given (Hovi 1998). 
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Figure 5: Solving the games with complete information 
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Under conditions of perfect information, in a world where the government was TYPE 
A, the Nash equilibrium would be {NOT SELL, BAILOUT}. In a world where the 
government was TYPE B, on the other hand, the Nash equilibrium would be  
{SELL, –}. These are hence the optimal outcomes corresponding to each type of 
government. In the real world, however, information was incomplete. 
 
6.3.6 Dealing with uncertainty 
The source of the insecurity for Lehman as to whether the government is TYPE A or 
B is as indicated previously the policy the government chose in dealing with the sub-
prime crisis from the beginning. It is largely recognized that Ben Bernanke’s 
predecessor as Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan, outspokenly conducted a policy of 
constructive ambiguity (Harris 2008). When Ben Bernanke took over the position as 
Fed Chairman in February of 2006, there was perceived to be a shift toward 
transparency in the day-to-day operations (Felton 2008). However, during the current 
financial crisis, it is evident that the handling of the crisis from the government has 
been that of constructive ambiguity up until Lehman’s demise. I base this on the fact 
that after Bear Stearns, there was no clear indication to the financial markets as to 
what would be the government’s stance if an important financial institution were to 
find itself on the brink of bankruptcy. As Elliot Schwartz and Charley Johnson write 
on the website for the Committee for Economic Development (CED), “The failure of 
Lehman Brothers, which was in part an attempt to maintain ‘ambiguity’ about the 
government's commitment to large financial institutions, and the intolerable 
consequences proved to all that there would be ‘no more Lehmans’” (2009).  
 
We can also be certain that the government did not adhere to an explicit TBTF 
doctrine because they did not announce that the US financial system would be 
backstopped until after Lehman had filed for Chapter 11 and AIG was bailed out – in 
the period after Lehman’s demise, the government adopted a policy very close to the 
TBTF doctrine (Schwartz and Johnson 2009). This means that, at least after-the-fact, 
it is possible to affirm that the government was indeed acting according to the policy 
of constructive ambiguity between mid March and mid September 2008.  
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Having bailed out Bear Stearns in March and Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac in the first 
week of September 2008, the government had in fact not let any major financial 
institution fail since the sub-prime crisis started when Lehman filed for bankruptcy. 
This implies that it seemed to rely heavily only on one of constructive ambiguity’s 
potential outcomes, namely the bailout option. This was no doubt observed and 
appreciated by the financial market, and institutions could, based on this observation 
coupled with the fact that no officials made clear statements to the contrary, assume 
that the government was “bailout-heavy” in dealing with the crisis. This means that 
the government was running a policy of constructive ambiguity which from an 
observer’s point of view could look like an inclination toward what we have labelled 
the TBTF doctrine. Under the understanding that financial institutions on Wall Street 
had reason to believe that the government was running a bailout-heavy version of 
constructive ambiguity at “worst”, or adhering to the TBTF doctrine at “best”, 
Lehman had reason to believe that the government might very well come to the rescue 
if things went very wrong. 
 
In order to establish how Lehman should choose in our stylized game taking this 
uncertainty into consideration, we first need to assess how the government looks from 
Lehman’s perspective. As stated, the government will always hold as its highest 
preference that Lehman choose strategy SELL, and this is also known to Lehman. 
With regard to the government’s ranking of the two remaining outcomes, this will 
depend on the government’s estimate of (si) compared to (ec + pc + mh), Lehman’s 
systemic importance compared to the cost of a bailout, represented by two types of 
government. Below is how the two types appear to Lehman in terms of preference 
ranking: 
 
Type A: 
 
Sale > Bailout > Demise 
 
 
 
Type B: 
Sale > Demise > Bailout 
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In other words, if the government is of TYPE A, it will respond to Lehman playing 
strategy NOT SELL with strategy BAILOUT. If the government is of TYPE B, it will 
respond to Lehman playing strategy NOT SELL with strategy DEMISE.  
 
Having established what the government will do as a response to Lehman’s strategy 
NOT SELL across the two potential types, Lehman can discover the values of p for 
which the expected payoff of each available strategy exceeds that of the other (Gates 
and Humes 1997). On the left side of the following equation is the expected utility for 
Lehman to play strategy NOT SELL, and on the right, the expected utility from 
playing strategy SELL: 
 
 
P (pb) + (1 – p) (d) > p (ps – co) + (1 – p) (ps – co) 
 
p(pb) + d – p(d) > p(ps – co) + (ps – co) – p(ps – co) 
 
p(pb) + d – p(d) > (ps – co)  
 
p(pb)– p(d) > ps – co – d 
 
p (pb – d) > ps – co – d 
 
p > ps – co – d 
      pb – d 
 
 
Knowing that the value of (d) is 0, we can reduce the inequality further to 
 
p > ps – co 
      pb 
 
 
Accordingly, Lehman should play strategy NOT SELL if the inequality holds. Before 
proceeding to finding equilibria in this game, we need to establish that the expression 
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on the right side of the inequality can take on a value between 0 and 1, meaning that 
the numerator is positive and less than the denominator (Gates and Humes 1997). We 
know from the discussion above that (ps – co) is positive, which satisfies the first 
requirement. The value of (pb) has also been stated to be positive. Furthermore, we 
have established that (ps – co) is smaller than (pb), which fulfils the second 
requirement, meaning that the right side of the inequality is a number between 0 and 1. 
 
6.3.7 Establishing equilibriums 
The equilibrium of the game depends on Lehman’s assessment of the value of p and 
the real preferences of the government, i.e. what type it is. The equilibria can thus be 
stated as follows: 
 
 
TYPE A: 
 
{NOT SELL, BAILOUT} if p > ps – co  
                  pb  
 
 
{SELL, –} if p < ps – co  
             pb  
 
 
TYPE B: 
 
{NOT SELL, DEMISE} if p > ps – co  
                pb  
 
 
{SELL, –} if p < ps – co  
             pb  
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We have here found an equilibrium that is the actual outcome of the interaction 
between Lehman Brothers and the government, namely the first equilibrium under 
TYPE B, {NOT SELL, DEMISE} – outcome Demise. Examining the equilibrium, 
Lehman would have reason to regret its action after the fact and want to change its 
strategy to SELL given the response of the government. This regret stems from the 
fact that after having observed the government’s move, Lehman knows what type the 
government is as opposed to before the government’s move, when Lehman only has p 
to estimate its type. As we will see below, this is exactly what happened, and after the 
government’s move, Lehman was not able to change its strategy.  
 
As we can see, the only way to reach this equilibrium is if Lehman believes that  
p > (ps – co) / (pb). Breaking down this expression, p has to be higher than the payoff 
from a sale minus the expected value of continued operation divided by the payoff 
Lehman expects from a bailout in order for Lehman to prefer to play strategy NOT 
SELL. This means that the higher the value Lehman estimate payoff (pb) to take on 
relative to payoff (ps – co), the more Lehman will be inclined to playing strategy 
NOT SELL even if p is relatively low. It also means that even if Lehman only values 
(pb) slightly over (ps – co), it still has an incentive to play strategy NOT SELL if the 
value of p is perceived to be sufficiently high. To demonstrate this, I will provide two 
examples inserting numerical values for p, (pb) and (ps – co) in the equilibrium above: 
 
Example 1: p is low, (pb) is high relative to (ps – co): 
 
p > ps – co 
     pb 
 
0.1 > 25 – 24 
        12 
 
0.1 > 0.083 
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Example 2: p is high, (pb) is only slightly higher than (ps – co): 
 
p > ps – co 
     pb 
 
0.9 > 2.75 – 1 
        2 
 
0.9 > 0.88 
 
In the first example, the likelihood of a bailout is small, but the benefit from a sale in 
the market is much smaller than the benefit from a bailout due to the high value of the 
expected return from continued operation. In this example the highest expected utility 
thus comes form playing strategy NOT SELL. 
 
In the second example the benefit gained from a bailout is only marginally larger than 
that gained from a sale minus expected value from future operations. However, the 
likelihood of receiving a bailout is very high; hence the highest expected utility comes 
form playing strategy NOT SELL in this example as well. I will argue that the 
empirical case was more likely to resemble the extreme in example 2 than example 1. 
 
We can establish that the real value of p depends on the government’s estimate of 
Lehman’s systemic importance minus the cost of bailing Lehman out. Keeping in 
mind that the real value of p would rise with the government’s inclination to bailing 
Lehman out as opposed to letting Lehman fail, what value is there reason to believe 
that Fuld estimated p to be? 
 
Fuld’s estimate of p would first and foremost depend on his assessment of Lehman’s 
systemic importance, and how he believed that the government estimated this. In 
order to present one take on Fuld’s view of Lehman’s systemic importance, I find it 
necessary to cite an entire section of Mr. Fuld’s statement in the testimony before the 
House of Representatives on the 6th of October 2008, being questioned by Mr. Welch 
of the Democratic Party. First Mr. Welch summarized what had happened in the crisis, 
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and stressed that Lehman had been treated differently than the other financial 
institutions when it was about to fail. The questioning then went as follows: 
 
“Mr. Welch: Did you have any concerns that there may be some arbitrary reasons why 
Lehman Brothers, facing similar predicaments as AIG, was allowed to fail, whereas 
AIG was the beneficiary of an $85 billion bailout sponsored by the Treasury 
Department?  
Mr. Fuld: Well, I clearly would have loved to have been part of the group that got that. 
Mr. Welch: Well, do you have any views on that or thoughts on that, why you were 
allowed to fail, You, Lehman Brothers, were allowed to fail and AIG was bailed out? 
Mr. Fuld: That was a decision that was made that Sunday afternoon. 
Mr. Welch: I know that. 
Mr. Fuld: And I was not there. 
Mr. Welch: You have got to be wondering. You are the head of this company. You 
want to keep it going. I understand from you everybody knew you were dedicated to 
the survival of Lehman. 
Mr. Fuld: Until the day they put me in the ground. 
Mr. Welch: Exactly. 
Mr. Fuld: I will wonder. 
… 
Mr. Welch: I will just ask you your opinion. Do you think that there was any justified 
reason why Lehman was treated one way; namely, allowed to fail, and AIG, just as 
another example, was given $85 billion in taxpayer assistance to bail it out? 
Mr. Fuld: I do not know why we were the only one.” (Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 2008) 
 
This statement by Fuld clearly gives an impression that he did consider Lehman 
Brothers not to be any different from the institutions that received a government 
bailout, and that Lehman was thus of sufficient systemic importance to warrant a 
bailout. 
 
Fuld’s statements aside, did Lehman have reason to believe that it was sufficiently 
important for the system to warrant a bailout, or are Fuld’s statements indicative of 
him trying to avoid some of the blame for Lehman failing? The bailout of Bear 
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Stearns is a crucial element here. As former chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan 
Greenspan said it in an interview, “[o]nce you put the line under Bear Stearns, that 
whole structure of financial and non-financial institutions above that automatically 
became too big to fail” (Torres and Harrington 2008). This signals support for Fuld’s 
uttered belief outlined above. 
 
Furthermore, according to Brunnermeier et al (2009) in chapter 4 in this thesis, the 
fall of an individually systemic institution with highly leveraged positions and 
maturity mismatch on their balance sheets causes negative externalities for the rest of 
the system. The pro-cyclical liquidity spirals would have a higher probability of 
increasing momentum in a negative direction for the system as a whole were Lehman 
to fall.  One important aspect here is that Fuld probably was in a better position to 
assess what would be the consequences of Lehman’s demise than the government was, 
even though the government had insight into Lehman’s books. This allows for the 
possibility that Lehman may have correctly perceived its systemic importance as 
higher than what the government appreciated, which in turn means that it is possible 
that the government would have chosen to bail Lehman out had they had Lehman’s 
knowledge of its systemic importance. Any effort to address this discrepancy in 
perception would most likely not be taken seriously, since Lehman had an incentive to 
exaggerate its systemic importance in order to increase the likelihood of a bailout 
(Rochet and Tirole 1996). 
 
When looking at the factors Fuld most likely evaluated when estimating whether or 
not he believed a bailout could be expected, it is reasonable to assume that he 
considered the likelihood of a bailout fairly high if Lehman stood on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Both Fuld’s testimony and my assessment of the situation above indicates 
that Lehman believed, and had reason to believe, that the government was very likely 
to be of TYPE A. When the government bailed out Bear Stearns, they demonstrated 
that the possibility of a bailout existed, generating expectations among the remaining 
financial institutions similar to those discussed in the chapter on moral hazard in this 
thesis. In game theoretical terms, the strategy BAILOUT was added to the 
government’s options in the eyes of financial institutions, to the degree they did not 
believe that the government already possess this capability beforehand, bringing p and 
(pb) into Lehman’s strategic reasoning. Bear Stearns’ bailout is not likely to have 
 70 
made Lehman believe that a bailout would be very generous, not even after the 
compensation for the shareholders of Bear Stearns was adjusted from $2 to $10. 
However, the compensation paid to the shareholders in the Bear Stearns bailout was 
significant compared to no bailout, and made Lehman estimate (pb) to be higher than 
(ps – co). I argue that (pb) was not perceived as substantially higher than (ps – co) by 
Lehman, hence p must have been perceived to be high, resembling example 2 above. I 
return to this in chapter 7. 
 
6.3.8 The outcome 
Lehman did not seal a deal with any of the potential buyers, and on the12th of 
September it was made explicit to the public that the government did not intend to 
commit government money to rescue Lehman Brothers7. Two of Paulson’s aides (his 
chief of staff Jim Wilkinson and spokeswoman Michele Davis) spread the word to the 
press that Paulson had vowed no taxpayer money would come to the aid of Lehman 
(Wessel 2009, Cho, Landy and Irwin 2008). The story hit the front page of the 
Washington Post as well as other media the same day (Cho et al. 2008). Fed officials 
were, according to Torres and Harrington (2008), taking a similar stand. This was the 
first time it was uttered in clear words from sources close to those who would in the 
end make the decision that no financial support would be given to rescue Lehman 
Brothers from bankruptcy.  
 
At this point, Fuld probably regretted that he hadn’t sold at an earlier stage. The 
problem was now that whether or not he could sell Lehman was no longer up to Fuld 
– there simply was no buyer. As Robert Peston of BBC News put it on the 14th of 
September (2008), “The stumbling block is that no bank or other financial institution 
wishes to take on Lehman's massive liabilities without some kind of protection or 
guarantees from the US government”. This means that the only way Lehman Brothers 
could be sold, was if it came with a government bailout. SELL was no longer an 
available strategy for Lehman, and their fate was in the government’s hands. 
 
                                                 
7
 There exists the theoretical possibility that this announcement was a bluff from the government. This 
could be modelled by allowing Lehman to change its strategy after the announcement. However, in our 
game the strategy SELL was not available for Lehman after the announcement; hence bluffing Lehman 
would have no merit.  
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As stated in the beginning of this thesis, Bank of America left talks and focused their 
attention on Merrill Lynch. When Barclays pulled out from talks, it was allegedly 
because they could not pull together a share holder vote to guarantee Lehman’s 
liabilities come Monday morning. Once this became clear, there was in effect no 
buyer for Lehman that the government could backstop a merger for even if they 
wanted to, hence the bailout a-la Bear Stearns option was ruled out for the 
government. The remaining bailout options were then a direct loan to Lehman, capital 
injection, converting to a bank holding company, or spinning off Lehman’s toxic 
assets in a separate unit which would be backstopped by the government. As observed, 
none of these measures were taken, and Lehman filed for chapter 11 early in the 
morning on the 15th of September. As to why the government did not implement any 
of these options, I will not go further than stating that the government must have 
deemed, perhaps mistakenly as indicated above, the cost of implementing the 
measures to exceed Lehman’s systemic importance.  
 
It is during the period between Bear Stearns’ bailout and the statements from Hank 
Paulson’s aides that no tax payer money would come to the rescue of Lehman that 
measures could have been taken to avoid the eventual outcome of Lehman defaulting. 
The good bank/bad bank measure and the option of turning Lehman into a bank 
holding company could have been undertaken during this period, as well as a capital 
injection. This is also the period in which Lehman could have sealed a deal with a 
buyer, all amounting to, in hindsight, six months of lost opportunities ending in a sub-
optimal outcome.  
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7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
Why did we end up with this outcome? I claim that the government’s policy choice 
provided Fuld with incentives that eventually led to a sub-optimal outcome. Demise 
was Lehman’s last and the government’s second preferred outcome, and as seen when 
solving the games with complete information, the Nash equilibrium when the 
government was TYPE B was outcome Sale. In the discussion of why this outcome 
was the result, we can treat the goal of constructive ambiguity – to keep financial 
institutions uncertain as to whether and how they will be bailed out – as an implicit 
threat made by the government. Jon Hovi in his book Games, threats and treaties: 
understanding commitments in international relations (1998: 11) defines a threat as “a 
contingent assertion signalling an intention to hurt somebody – physically, 
economically or otherwise – unless that somebody acts in the way prescribed by the 
threatener”. The proscribed manner is for us here avoiding the situation where a 
government bailout would be required to keep Lehman alive, and the potential 
punishment for transgression is the absence of a bailout. In other words, by abiding to 
the policy of constructive ambiguity, the government threatens that it will not provide 
a bailout if financial institutions find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. 
7.1 Conditions for a threat to be successful  
A threat can be deemed effective if it succeeds in making the target alter its behaviour 
in accordance with the threatener’s desires (Hovi 1998: 13). In the interaction between 
Lehman Brothers and the government the threat/constructive ambiguity would be 
judged successful if Lehman Brothers had sold the company and avoided bankruptcy 
without the need for government intervention. Hovi lists five conditions that must be 
fulfilled in order for a threat to be judged effective: 
 
Relevance 
The first condition is that “[t]he threat must be relevant, in the sense that it can have 
an impact on the outcome” (Hovi 1998: 13-14, italics in original). This means that the 
threatened part must have room to manoeuvre, and that it must have an incentive to go 
against the threatener. I have established in the analysis that in all likelihood both of 
these were present: Lehman could have sold if they wanted to, and Lehman could 
have an incentive not to sell if it anticipated that the government would provide a 
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bailout, which I have established that it did. Constructive ambiguity could thus 
potentially lead Lehman to acting differently from what it would have if it could be 
certain that a bailout was forthcoming, i.e. if p was known to be 1. 
 
Severity 
Second, “… the threat must be sufficiently severe to make a difference to the target” 
(Hovi 1998: 14). Constructive ambiguity definitely could produce an outcome that 
would be very severe for Lehman, namely Demise. Demise was Lehman’s least 
preferred outcome providing a payoff of 0, making the threat very severe for Lehman. 
 
Credibility 
The third condition is that “…to be effective, a threat needs to be credible” (Hovi 
1998: 15). The credibility of a threat relates to the degree to which the target believes 
that the threatener will carry out the threat if the target’s actions do not correspond 
with the threatener’s wishes. A threat can be extremely severe, yet prove to be 
impotent if the target believes that it will not be put into effect (Hovi 1998: 15). This 
is the most important of the conditions for our purpose, I thus return to credibility 
after having presented the remaining conditions.  
 
Completeness 
“A fourth condition for a threat to be credible is that it is complete” (Hovi 1998: 15). 
A threat is complete if the target believes that if he does comply with the threatener’s 
wishes, the threat will not be effectuated. In the analysis conducted in this thesis, this 
condition is met automatically since if Lehman Brothers manages to find a solution in 
the market a bailout will not take place. Hence, if Lehman complies with the threat, it 
becomes irrational to bail them out, thus the criteria of completeness is assumed to be 
met automatically. 
 
Clearness 
“…in order to be effective, a threat has to be sufficiently clear” (Hovi 1998: 16). This 
means that the message conveyed in the threat must be understood by the target, and it 
must get through to the target. 
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One fundamental trait of the policy option of constructive ambiguity is that it 
effectively eliminates the possibility of being clear. With the public announcement by 
Paulson’s aides three days before Lehman declared bankruptcy, the threat was made 
explicit for the first time, which definitely contributed to making the until then 
implicit threat clearer. If the same had been uttered a couple of months earlier when 
Lehman was apparently still in relatively good shape, much less credibility would 
likely have been attributed to it. However, the timing of the statements made the 
commitment much more credible, since it was becoming increasingly apparent that 
Lehman was facing bankruptcy if no measures were taken. I will return to this below. 
7.2 Assessing credibility 
I will here discuss the credibility of the threat implicit in constructive ambiguity in the 
game between Lehman and the government, in light of the conditions above. I will 
argue that the threat not to provide a bailout was not credible, and discuss why I find 
this was the case. First of all, how does a lack of credibility for constructive ambiguity 
look in game theoretical terms for the game that has been analyzed in this thesis? 
 
To reiterate, the Nash equilibrium under government TYPE B when we solved the 
games with complete information was {SELL, -} – outcome Sale. Under incomplete 
information the corresponding equilibrium (not the outcome, but the other potential 
outcome of government TYPE B) takes the following form: 
 
{SELL, –} if p < ps – co  
             pb  
 
The equilibrium above represents the most preferred outcome for the government and 
the second highest preferred outcome for Lehman. To arrive at this outcome, Lehman 
has to estimate p to be lower than the value of a sale minus the expected value of 
continued operation divided by the value of a bailout. In the analysis I argued that 
Lehman did not have reason to value (pb) sufficiently higher than (ps – co) to choose 
strategy NOT SELL with a relatively low estimate of p. Hence the reason why 
strategy NOT SELL was chosen by Lehman, I argued, was that Lehman believed p to 
be relatively high. This means that the government’s threat lost credibility due to it 
not being able to influence Lehman’s perception of p in a way that could lead Lehman 
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to adjust its estimate sufficiently downward for it to choose strategy SELL. Why did 
Lehman hold such a high estimate of p?  
 
As discussed previously, the aim of constructive ambiguity is to portray the 
government in as bailout-averse a manner as possible while allowing it to retain the 
discretion to provide a bailout if it deems macroeconomic stability to be at risk. 
Having bailed out Bear Stearns in March, the government had let the genie out of the 
bottle (Goodhart cited by Hilsenrath et al. 2009) and put a line under financial 
institutions bigger than Bear Stearns, providing them with reason to believe they 
would be rescued (Torres and Harrington 2008). At the time of bailing out Fannie 
Mae and Freddy Mac in the first week of September 2008, the government had in fact 
not let any major financial institution fail since the sub-prime crisis erupted. This 
indicates that the government relied heavily on only one of constructive ambiguity’s 
potential outcomes, namely bailout. This was no doubt observed and appreciated by 
financial institutions, who could reasonably suppose the government to be taking a 
“bailout-heavy” approach in dealing with the crisis. The implication is that the 
government was running a policy of constructive ambiguity which from an observer 
and Wall Street’s point of view could look like an inclination toward what we have 
labelled the TBTF doctrine. With the justifiable understanding that the government 
was running a bailout-heavy version of constructive ambiguity at “worst”, and 
adhering to the TBTF doctrine at “best”, Lehman had good reason to believe that p 
was relatively high right after Bear Stearns was bailed out. After this, Lehman’s 
estimate of p can be expected to have risen as time passed and no significant financial 
institutions went belly up – and especially after Fannie and Freddy were bailed out.  
 
On the 10th of July 2008, between the rescues of Bear and Fannie/Freddy, Paulson 
held a speech on regulatory reform before the House Committee on Financial Services. 
Here, he stated that for market discipline to be effective, market participants cannot 
expect that government assistance will be readily available. He continued “For market 
discipline to effectively constrain risk, financial institutions must be allowed to 
fail…” (Paulson 2008). Even this statement is not likely to have done much in order 
to adjust Lehman’s estimate of p downwards, I argue. The reason for this is that it is 
not costly for the government to make such a general announcement in public; it may 
benefit from it if financial institutions perceive the statement as an indication that the 
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government will not come to their rescue. On the other hand, if the government goes 
ahead and bails out a financial institution after having made such an announcement, 
the effect of the actual bailout in terms of moral hazard will be a far greater concern 
for the government than the credibility it will have lost for acting counter to a general 
statement like the one made by Paulson in July. Lehman and other Wall Street firms 
were, however, unlikely to have been frightened by this statement by Paulson: The 
government’s “actions [had] spoken louder than words” (Goodhart cited by Hilsenrath 
et al. 2009). 
 
With regard to the assessment of systemic importance, as stated in the analysis, there 
is also a strong possibility that Lehman may have had a higher assessment of its 
systemic importance than what the government had. If this was the case, it would be a 
contributing factor to Lehman estimating p to be sufficiently high to warrant playing 
strategy NOT SELL. In other words, Lehman may have deemed itself of higher 
systemic importance than what the government did. This explanation opens up the 
possibility that the government made a mistake in letting Lehman go, and that they 
would have acted differently had they shared Lehman’s estimate of (si). Whether a 
mistake was made is still a hot topic for debate one year after Lehman’s bankruptcy.  
 
7.3 The aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy 
Does the period after Lehman’s demise provide any indication as to how the 
government evaluated the outcome of its handling of the crisis thus far? The events 
following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing indicate that this marked a turning 
point in the government’s approach: The day after Lehman collapsed the Fed saved 
American International Group (AIG) with an emergency loan of $85 billion. This, 
however, did not prevent credit markets all over the world from freezing up: Reserve 
Primary Fund, a money market fund that held Lehman bonds, became the first money 
fund in 14 years to “break the buck,” the term for falling below the $1 a share (McKee 
and Chen 2009, Nocera 2009).  At this point, according to the New York Times 
(2009b), Mr. Paulson decided to take a more systemic approach and stop dealing with 
the crisis one case at a time. Paulson and Bernanke approaching Congress marked the 
conception of the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that was 
eventually passed after two rounds in Congress. The final version was passed in 
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Congress and the Senate, and signed into law by President Bush on the 3rd of October 
2008 (New York Times 2009b). It was soon made clear that the 14th of September 
2008 would be the last time the government said “No” to helping a significant 
financial institution in distress (Wessel 2009).  
 
7.4 Addressing the problem 
Having provided an account for how the interaction between Lehman and the 
government resulted in a sub-optimal outcome begs the question: What could have 
been done differently? What could the government have done to increase the 
likelihood of arriving at the Nash equilibrium from the game with complete 
information? Four measures are theoretically possible: Provide reason to adjust the 
estimate of p downwards, the estimate of (pb) downwards, the estimate of (ps) 
upwards or the estimate of (co) downwards. The two latter are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, and will not be discussed. The former two, however, are under the 
government’s influence.  
 
If the government could succeed in removing its own strategy BAILOUT and 
Lehman’s corresponding payoff (pb) from the game entirely, Lehman would always 
choose strategy SELL, since DEMISE would be the certain outcome from playing 
strategy NOT SELL: The government would always be TYPE A. How this could be 
achieved is beyond the scope of my analysis, thus I choose to be agnostic as to how 
this could be achieved in practical terms. 
 
Alternatively, if the government cannot eliminate the BAILOUT option, or it does not 
wish to, it can do everything in its power to make bailouts as painful as possible for 
the bailed out party by making sure the value of (pb) is as small as possible. Then the 
question becomes if it is possible to rescue a financial institution and punish its 
management and shareholders sufficiently not to spur moral hazard at the same time. 
This is also beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 
The other way to address the problem would be to ensure that financial institutions’ 
perception of p would be low. The only way to conceivably achieve this is, as we 
have seen, not to bail out financial institutions. In chapter 3 I wrote that the concern 
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about spill-over is easily converted to protection of uninsured creditors for 
policymakers, which implies that if a government is granted discretion in dealing with 
financial crises, it is very tempting to convert discretion coupled with fear of spill-
overs to bailout.  
 
This means that for constructive ambiguity to be a viable policy to obtain its goal of 
preventing moral hazard, the government has to install some mechanism that limits its 
discretion with regard to which institutions are bailed out. Hovi (1998: 42 - 44) 
proscribes, as one of several measures to make a threat more credible, to leave 
something up to chance. This implies that the threatener would not be in full control 
of what the result would be if the target did not comply with the threat. The literature 
distinguishes between threats of deterrence and threats of compellence (Hovi 1998), 
where the latter is of interest for us here. Threats of compellence threaten that “if 
transgression occurs, then the threatener will take action which sets in motion a 
random mechanism” which may or may not bring about consequences that are 
perceived by the target as punishment.  
 
The point to be made is that the threatener, after having activated the random 
mechanism, does not control the outcome of the mechanism’s “decision”. For instance, 
the government could flip a coin and call that heads would signify bailout, tails 
bankruptcy. Such a measure would make constructive ambiguity a truly mixed 
strategy for dealing with financial institutions in distress, meaning that there would be 
a 50-50 chance for a bailout. This would make the threat more credible, while at the 
same time opening up the possibility that an institution that was indeed individually 
systemic would be allowed to fail, with the repercussions this would imply for the 
financial system and the economy. Chapter 3 demonstrates that financial institutions 
may go under even if their business is fundamentally sound under certain 
circumstances, meaning that even if such a policy was successful as a deterrent, the 
system could still experience a systemic crisis as a consequence if an individually 
systemic financial institution stood on the verge of bankruptcy and the government’s 
coin showed tails.  
 
 79 
7.5 Conclusion 
This thesis sought to examine what caused the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy through 
analyzing two interrelated puzzles, namely why Lehman did not find a market 
solution in time, and secondly why the government did not provide a bailout to 
Lehman Brothers to avoid the bankruptcy of a systemically important financial 
institution. My approach has been first to gain an understanding of what happens 
when the financial system experiences liquidity shortage coupled with financial 
institutions of systemic significance having taken on excessive risk and relied heavily 
on leverage with maturity mismatch on their balance sheets. Secondly, I have 
attempted to identify the theoretical rationale likely to be underlying government 
decisions in a situation such as the one described, what the options available for the 
government are, and what may guide its decision. 
 
In the analysis I have constructed a stylized game where I have sought to capture the 
interaction between the government and Lehman Brothers in the six month period 
preceding Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, starting with the bailout of Bear Stearns. By 
examining the interaction where Lehman acted under incomplete information due to 
the government’s policy of constructive ambiguity, I demonstrated how we arrived at 
the outcome where Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Before that, I showed that 
had the game been played under complete information, the equilibrium strategies 
would have resulted in Lehman Brothers finding a solution in the market. These are 
the central findings in my thesis: Had the government been able to signal to Lehman 
Brothers in a credible way that no bailout was forthcoming, there is reason to believe 
that the outcome would have been different. 
 
I identified the government’s choice of policy – constructive ambiguity – as the 
reason why the government did not succeed in making Lehman change its strategy. 
After having bailed out Bear Stearns, there was simply no easy way for the 
government to credibly convey the message to the financial markets that the implicit 
insurance inherent in government bailouts would not be handed out if financial 
institutions stood in danger of failing. Thus, when the day came that Lehman stood on 
the verge of bankruptcy, it was too late for Lehman to find a buyer, and the 
government deemed a bailout too expensive in terms of the moral hazard and the 
economical and political costs such a move would imply. 
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In discussing the policy of constructive ambiguity as it was applied preceding Lehman 
brother’s failure, I found the policy to be theoretically flawed due to the consequences 
of the time inconsistency problem inherent in the discretion that comes with it, 
coupled with governments’ eagerness to bail out systemically significant financial 
institutions in order to avoid the spill-overs that follow their failure. I further showed 
that even if the government could impose a randomizing mechanism – which would 
boost the deterrent effect that ideally should follow the policy – the policy would be 
unattractive due to the fact that fundamentally sound financial institutions can fail due 
to market imperfections event if behaviour has been prudent. In other words, even 
when addressing the problems inherent in government discretion, the policy could 
allow failure even when a rescue would in all likelihood be beneficial for the 
economy as a whole. 
 
In the analysis, I undertook several simplifying measures in order to account for the 
interaction between the government and Lehman Brothers. The validity of my 
findings rests on the assumption that these simplifying steps hold empirically. 
Furthermore, I have relied heavily on secondary sources for the empirical account in 
this thesis. Even when all precautions are taken to assure the reliability of secondary 
sources, one can never guarantee completely that their presentation of reality is 
correct. Furthermore there is the possibility that the bias inherent in secondary 
sources’ accounts has gone by undetected in my research. 
 
It is also possible that portraying the entire period between Bear Stearns’ bailout and 
Lehman’s failure as one game is a flawed approach. This may be the most significant 
critique of my approach, since it is not unlikely that the government may have 
preferred to bail Lehman out during parts of this period. It is theoretically possible 
that the government preferred to bail Lehman out up until the very day of Lehman 
filing for bankruptcy. It is particularly conceivable that the government after bailing 
out Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac adjusted its perception of the political cost and the 
effect a bailout would have on moral hazard upwards, maybe sufficiently to go from 
preferring to bail Lehman out to preferring to let it go under. This would explain why 
the government did not announce that a bailout would not be forthcoming before the 
12th of September. My counterargument here is that it does not matter for the outcome 
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of the game what the government’s preferences really are; all that matters is Lehman’s 
perception of these preferences. Furthermore, I have shown that, even if the 
government had announced earlier that no bailout was forthcoming, it is unlikely that 
it would have altered Lehman’s estimate of the deciding parameters to any significant 
degree, as the statements’ signalling effect would be subordinate to that of the 
government’s actions.  
 
There is no doubt letting Lehman go under did an outstanding job for lowering moral 
hazard and regain momentum for constructive ambiguity. That effect, however, in all 
likelihood lasted shortly – until AIG was bailed out the following day. Soon after, the 
government would proclaim that the TBTF doctrine was implemented and 
constructive ambiguity abandoned as an approach to meeting financial institutions in 
distress. This indicates that the government cannot have its cake and eat it too – if it 
wants financial institutions not to expect being bailed out, it cannot provide bailouts to 
financial institutions. In all likelihood, preventing systemic risk has to come from 
elsewhere than constructive ambiguity.  
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